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Current proposals to lift federal content controls from the
broadcasting industry are of particular concern to those interested
in citizen access to the channels of mass communication. Among
the key targets of broadcast deregulation proponents are those
content controls that provide at least limited access rights for
ideas and individuals.' Media access, although no longer the
movement it was in the late 1960's and early 1970's, remains an
B ., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1970, M.A., University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 1978; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1981; Assistant Professor, School of
Journalism, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. On September 17, 1981, the Federal Communications Commission asked Congress
to repeal: the fairness doctrine, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1984) (referred to in section 315 of the
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(4) (1982)), which obligates broadcasters to devote a
reasonable amount of time to the balanced coverage of controversial issues of public impor-
tance; section 315 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982), which requires broad-
casters to "afford equal opportunities" to all legally qualified candidates for a public office
once one such candidate has been granted air time; and section 312(a)(7), 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(7) (1982), which requires broadcasters to provide "reasonable access" for candi-
dates for federal office. FCCgoesfor broke tofree radio-TV, BROADCASTING, Sept. 21,1981,
at 23. See also S. 1917, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REc. S13,475 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1983)
(proposal to amend the Communications Act to repeal the equal opportunities and fairness
doctrine provisions by Senator Packwood). See generally Fowler & Brenner, A Market-
place Approach to Broadcast Reguation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982).
The fairness doctrine and sections 315 and 312 often have been cited as guarantees of
citizen access to broadcasting. It should be recognized, however, that these access provi.
sions are extremely limited in their application. The fairness doctrine was designed to pro-
vide access for issues and points of view, not individuals. See Committee for the Fair
Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970); Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C.2d 27, 30-31 (1970). Furthermore, FCC and
court interpretations and applications of the doctrine have made it relatively ineffective as
a device for providing access for issues and viewpoints. See S. SIMMONs, THE FAInRESS
DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA (1978). The personal attack and political editorial rules, 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.1920, 73.1930 (1984), promulgated to augment the basic fairness doctrine, do
guarantee personal access to certain individuals and groups, but the access rights are con-
tingent and available only to a very few. Likewise, section 315 provides only contingent
access rights for political candidates, with the licensee retaining the power to deny access to
all candidates by denying access to one. Only candidates for federal office can claim broad
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issue and often a demand today.2 If statutory and administrative
access rights are eliminated, persons seeking access to broadcast
channels for themselves, their ideas and their causes are likely to
turn more frequently to the United States Constitution as an ac-
cess tool.
Claims of a first amendment right of access to the broadcast me-
dia are not new. For forty years the federal courts have heard the
argument that the first amendment precludes broadcast licensees
from denying citizens access to the channels they control.' Grow-
ing concern over increased concentration of control over the me-
dia in the late 1960's made a constitutional right of access a salient
issue.4 Now, as ownership concentration remains a concern and
the removal of content controls becomes a real possibility, the first
amendment as a source of access rights is again a topic in need of
exploration.
The key barrier to judicial recognition of a constitutional right
of access is the government action requirement of the first amend-
ment. Unless a broadcaster's denial of access can be deemed gov-
access rights to broadcast media, thanks to enactment of section 312(a)(7) in 1972. See CBS
v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
2. A 1967 article by Jerome Barron generally is credited as providing the impetus for
the so-called access movement. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). Barron's seminal article was followed by a raft of
others, see infra note 4, as well as lawsuits against the media in which individuals and
groups called upon the courts to recognize rights of access to the mass media. See, e.g.,
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100
(D. Colo. 1971); Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
307 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. 111. 1969), affd, 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 973
(1971). Despite judicial refusal to recognize any broad constitutional right of access to
either print or broadcast media, individuals who are stymied in their attempts to get media
owners and managers voluntarily to grant them access continue to bring suit.
3. Mclntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co. of Philadelphia, 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.
1945), cert denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946), was the first recorded case in which citizens sought a
constitutional right of access to a broadcast channel.
4. See, e.g., J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973); B. SCHMIDT, FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS VS. PuBLIc ACCESS (1976); Bagdikian, Right of Access: A Modest Propo-
sal, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Spring 1968, at 1; Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the
Media?, 48 TEx. L. REv. 766 (1970); Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access
to the Media, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron, supra note 2; Botein, Clearing the
Airwaves for Access, 59 A.B.A. J. 38 (1973); Daniel, Right of Access to Mass Media-Govern-
ment Obligation to Enforce First Amendment?, 48 TEx. L. REV. 783 (1970); Henderson,
Access to the Media: A Problem in Democracy, COLUm. JOURNALISM REV., Spring 1969, at 5;
Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth-Century Soapbom The Right to Purchase Radio and Televi-
sion Time, 57 VA. L. REv. 574 (1971); Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regula-
tion of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessmen4 52 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1973); Malone,
Broadcasting, The Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amendment of Access End the Sup-
pressing of Controversial Issues?, 5 U. MICH. J.L REF. 194 (1972).
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ernment action, the first amendment is simply inapplicable. In an
effort to determine whether the Constitution may be used to fill
the access gap that would be left by elimination of such policies as
the fairness doctrine,5 personal attack and political editorial
rules,6 and sections 312 and 315 of the Communications Act,7 this
article explores the judiciary's responses to claims that broadcast-
ers are engaged in government action, and analyzes the applicabil-
ity of state action doctrine to commercial radio and television.,
Section II presents an overview of state action doctrine and defini-
tions of the various types of state action courts have identified.9
The earliest government action claims against broadcasters are re-
viewed briefly in section III. Judicial responses to later state ac-
tion claims and the applicability of each of the major threads of
state action doctrine are addressed in sections IV-VI.
II
State Action
One approach to creating a constitutional right of access, es-
poused especially by the access movement's leading prophet, Pro-
fessor Jerome Barron, called for an affirmative interpretation of
the first amendment, an interpretation that would assign govern-
ment an obligation to promote and provide opportunities for ex-
pression by guaranteeing and protecting the individual's right to at
least some limited form of access to newspapers and broadcast me-
5. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1984).
6. 47 C.F.P §§ 73.1920, 73.1930 (1984).
7. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (1982). See also supra note 1.
8. This study is concerned solely with privately owned broadcast outlets. Courts have
been called on to decide cases involving constitutional challenges to programming decisions
by government-owned and operated stations. In such cases, however, state action generally
is not an issue, since the parties and courts agree that the stations are government instru-
mentalities subject to constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Muir v. Alabama Educ. Televi-
sion Comm'n, 656 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1981), qffd on rehg, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); Barnstone v. University of Houston, 514 F. Supp.
670 (S.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd, 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1981), affd on rehearing, 688 F.2d 1033
(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983); Kelley v. WMUL-TV, 7 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1095 (S.D. Va. 1980).
9. The treatment of state action doctrine that follows is, of necessity, incomplete,
since the focus of this article is the doctrine's applicability to only one sphere of private
activity-broadcasting. For a more comprehensive overview of state action doctrine, see,
e.g., G. GuNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 978-1028 (1980); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMSAR & J.
CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1511-73 (1980); L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 18-1 to -7 (1978); Choper, Thoughts on State Action. The "Government Function" and
"Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 WARIL U.L.Q. 757; Note, State Action: Theories for Ap
plying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656 (1974).
No. 2]
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dia.10 The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC," upholding the constitutionality of the
fairness doctrine, was seen by some as judicial acceptance of this
affirmative interpretation approach.12  In general, though, the
Court has been unresponsive to the affirmative interpretation ar-
gument, maintaining that the first amendment places restraints
on government action but does not require affirmative govern-
ment action to promote free expression.'3
The Supreme Court's refusal to interpret the first amendment
as requiring affirmative legislative or administrative steps to guar-
antee citizen access to broadcasting means that an approach work-
ing within the traditional prohibitory interpretation of the first
amendment is needed to support a constitutional access right.
Under this approach, access seekers must argue that media own-
ers and managers are guilty of abridging the first amendment
when they deny individuals the opportunity to disseminate their
messages to the public via mass media. The major stumbling
block to this second approach is the so-called state action or gov-
ernment action doctrine.
It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that the first
amendment, as well as most constitutional provisions, applies only
to the actions of government. 14 Restraints on expression imposed
by private individuals and entities are outside the scope of the first
amendment. Federal District Court Judge Warren Ferguson
stated that basic constitutional ground rule: "The state action con-
cept stands for the principle that individuals, in the absence of
valid government regulation, are free to be ornery in their private
lives."' 5 Thus, the state action doctrine is perhaps most accurately
described as the state action limitation. During the past forty
10. J. BARRON, supra note 4, at 73-74; Barron, supra note 2, at 1641-69.
11. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
12. Access supporters especially relied on the Court's statement that the rights of
viewers and listeners were paramount to the rights of broadcasters, id. at 390, a statement
that prompted Professor Barron to say that the Court had "revolutionalized First Amend-
ment thinking" and recognized the "primacy of the audience." J. BARRON, supra note 4, at
144-45.
13. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); CBS v. Dem-
ocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
14. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,837 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
156 (1978).
15. Writers Guild of Am. West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), are generally cited as the first enunciation of the state
action requirement, although earlier cases laid the groundwork for the Civil Rights Cases
ruling. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1882); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
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years, however, courts have expanded the state action concept to
allow some seemingly private actions to be subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny.16 As the term is frequently used today, the state
action doctrine has come to refer to the criteria courts use to de-
termine whether apparently private action is sufficiently govern-
mental in character or so entwined with government action that it
ceases to be "private" and becomes, for constitutional purposes,
government action.'7 The state action doctrine, then, has enabled
courts to continue observing the basic constitutional ground rule
while applying constitutional standards to conduct that, at one
time, would have been considered private."8
During the mid-1900's, state action doctrine was primarily a tool
for judicially combating racial discrimination through application
of the fourteenth amendment to ostensibly private actions.' 9 In
the 1950's and 1960's, an expansive interpretation of state action,
coupled with the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause,
enabled federal courts to do what Congress could not or would not
346 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 553-55 (1875).
16. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), generally is recognized as the first case in
which the Supreme Court applied the first amendment to the actions of an apparently
private entity, in this case, a privately owned company town. Other state action cases ap-
plying the first amendment to private entities include Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (shopping center); Public
Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (transit company); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d
845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) (railroad station).
Cases applying the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment to seemingly private individuals and entities have been more numerous. See, e.g.,
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
17. State action doctrine developed, and still is primarily applied, in cases involving
alleged violations of the fourteenth amendment. In such cases, the Issue is whether consti-
tutional provisions specifically directed to state governments can be applied to private ac-
tions. However, courts have also been called on to decide cases involving the alleged
involvement of the federal government with private actions, that is, federal action. In these
cases, the issue is the applicability of constitutional provisions addressed to the federal gov-
ernment, such as the first and fifth amendments. Courts use the same approaches, princi-
ples, and indicia of government involvement in analyzing claims of both federal and state
action. "The standards used for determining the existence of federal government action
under the fifth amendment are Identical to those used for finding state action under the
fourteenth amendment." Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Servs., 697 F.2d 447, 449 (1st Cir.
1983). Therefore, no distinction is made between federal and state action, and the terms
state action and government action are used interchangeably.
18. P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERT=S AND THE CONSTITUTION 165-66 (1962).
19. See Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term-Forewod. "State Action, " Equal Pra-
tection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L REV. 69 (1967); Van Alstyne & Karst,
State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Note, supra note 9.
No. 2]
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do to eliminate discrimination. Once Congress began enacting
civil rights legislation, the need for resort to the self-executing as-
pects of the fourteenth amendment diminished.' The state action
doctrine legacy remained, however, and litigants began, using a
tool designed to eradicate racism for a host of other purposes.
State action doctrine was invoked in creditor-debtor controver-
sies; 1 dismissed employees sought to prove their employers were
engaged in state action;' private security forces were accused of
violating constitutional search and seizure provisions;2 attempts
were made to apply constitutional requirements to private hospi-
tals, nursing homes, and schools;' and persons seeking access to
the communications media contended state action was present in
. 20. The fourteenth amendment, added to the Constitution in the wake of the Civil
War, contains five sections. Section one defines federal and state citizenship and contains
the privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection clauses. Section two per-
mitted all blacks to be counted for representation in Congress, providing they were granted
the same voting rights as white citizens. Section three prohibited Southern political and
governmental leaders from holding federal or state office, and section four declared the
U.S. public debt inviolable, but declared debts incurred by the Confederacy and claims for
the loss or emancipation of slaves illegal and void. The final section states that Congress
shall have the power to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment through legis-
lation. Sections two, three, and four soon became little more than historical footnotes,
while sections one and five developed into major tools for the judiciary and Congress. Im-
mediately after enactment of the amendment and again during the second half of the twen-
tieth century, Congress utilized the power granted it by the fifth section of the amendment.
During the intervening years, however, the Supreme Court interpreted the due process and
equal protection clauses as self-executing provisions, guaranteeing individual rights even in
the absence of enforcing legislation. See G. GuNTmER, supra note 9, at 973; Glennon &
Nowak, A Functional Analysis Qf the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement
1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221, 222-24.
21. See, eg., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Earnest v. Lowen-
tritt, 690 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982); Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir.
1982); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cr. 1976); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage
Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cr. 1975); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
22. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal
Servs., 697 F.2d 447 (1st Cr. 1983); McVarsh v. Mid-Nebraska Community Mental Health
Center, 696 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1982); Griffith v. Bell-Whitley Community Action Agency, 614
F.2d 1102 (6th Cr.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980); Musso v. Surlano, 586 F.2d 59 (7th Cr.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382
(3d Cir. 1976).
23. See, e.g., White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140 (5th Cr. 1979); United States v. Fran-
coeur, 547 F.2d 891 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977); Commonwealth v. Leone, 386
Mass. 329, 435 N.E.2d 1036 (1982); United States v. Ima, 424 A.2d 113 (D.C. 1980); People v.
Holloway, 82 Mich. App. 629, 267 N.W.2d 454 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982); Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1982); Milonas v. Wil-
lIams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cr. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); Waters v. St. Francis
Hosp., 618 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1980); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 581 F.2d 658 (7th
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the activities of newspaper owners and broadcasters.'
Several judicial definitions of, and so-called tests for, state ac-
tion have evolved over the years.26 State action doctrine was de-
veloped in the 1940's and 1950's by the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Vinson,' and during the 1960's the concept entered a pe-
riod of rapid growth in the hands of the Warren Court.'0 Both the
Vinson and Warren Courts utilized fact-oriented, nondoctrinal
analyses, which enabled them to keep state action doctrine flexi-
ble and fluid.20 By the mid-1960's, some commentators were sug-
gesting that the reach of state action doctrine was virtually
limitless since government was involved in all private activity, if
only by permitting or failing to prohibit certain conduct. 30 In the
1970's, though, the Burger Court began restricting, or at least re-
fusing to expand, the applicability of the state action concept s.3  To
Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1135 (1979); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513
F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975).
25. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Gemini Enters. v.
WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559 (M.D.N.C. 1979); Resident Participation of Den-
ver, Inc., v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971); Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 307 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. 111.1969), offd, 435 F.2d 470 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
26. It may be more appropriate and desirable to treat state action tests as an analytical
tool or framework for making what is essentially a factual determination. Thus, the ques-
tion would be not whether the "facts and circumstances of a particular case" pass or fail a
particular state action test, but whether those facts, appraised in the light of an analytical
framework, indicate that the private conduct can be attributed to the state. Gerena v. Pu-
erto Rico Legal Services, Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 449 (1st Cr. 1983). See also Cobb, State Action
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments A Brief Review of Recent Developments, 17
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 533, 536-37 (1983). In its recent trilogy of state action cases, however,
the Supreme Court continued to treat the various state action indicia seriatim as separate
"tests" for determining the presence of state action. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982). Since the focus of this article requires identification of what "is" in the area of state
action, rather than what "should be," the test approach to state action will be utilized.
27. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451 (1952); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
28. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382.U.S. 296
(1966); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963);
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
29. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, Due Process Creditor's Self-Help and State Action,
92 HAnv. L. REV. 120, 125 (1978). See also Black, supra note 19.
30. See, ag, P. KAUPER, supra note 18, at 165-66; Black, supra note 19, at 95-109;, Silard,
A Constitutional Forecast, Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection
Guarantee, 66 COLutm. L REv. 855, 867-72 (1966).
31. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
No. 2]
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accomplish this, the Court developed a more doctrinal, less fact-
oriented approach to state action and began identifying different
types of state action according to various conceptual definitionsu
Courts and commentators generally recognize two broad catego-
ries of state action-private performance of a government or pub-
lic function and government involvement/participation with
private actors. ss The latter category can be manifested either
through a symbiotic relationship between government and a pri-
vate party, a relationship of interdependence that converts all acts
of the private party into state action,' or through the existence of
an affirmative nexus or connection between government and the
specific challenged conduct.3 Thus, three threads of state action
doctrine-government function, symbiosis, and nexus-are gener-
ally identified. In light of the Supreme Court's recent trilogy of
state action decisions, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,' Lugar v. Edmon-
son Oil Co.,' and Blum v. Yaretsky, it appears that all three
types of state action continue to retain vitality. In each of the deci-
sions handed down June 25, 1982, the majority opinion was au-
thored by a different member of the Court, and each employed a
345 (1974); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
According to Professor Choper, "lit is on the topic of state action that one can find the
clearest area of conservatism on the part of the Burger Court and the most unqualified
reversal of position from that adhered to by the Burger Court's predecessor." State Action,
in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMLRAR & L. TamE, THE SUPREME COURT. TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
1978-1979, at 265 (1979).
32. The Supreme Cour, 1977 Term, supra note 29, at 125.
33. For recent Supreme Court discussions and applications of both categories of state
action, see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). For more detailed discus-
sions of the types of state action, see G. GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 985-1028; W. LOCKHART,
Y. KAM~ssAR & J. CHOPER, upra note 9, at 1515-73; Note, supra note 9, at 661-98.
The two broad categories of public function and involvement/participation parallel the
two state action arguments Justice Harlan put forth in his Civil Rights Cases dissent.
Harlan contended railroads, inns, and places of public amusement were subject to the four-
teenth amendment as agents of the state because they were "charged with duties to the
public" and "amenable . . . to governmental regulations." 109 U.S. 3, 58-59 (1883).
34. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 US. 345, 357-58 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972); Community Medical Center v. Emergency Medical
Serva., 712 F.2d 878, 880 (3d Cir. 1983); Comment, The State Action Doctrine in the State
and Federal Courts, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 893, 896-98 (1984).
35. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at
351; Community Medical Center v. Emergency Medical Serva., 712 F.2d at 880; Comment,
supra note 34, at 898-902.
36. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
37. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
38. 457 US. 991 (1982).
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somewhat different analytical and rhetorical approach. 9 Despite
the differences among the three opinions, taken together they in-
dicate that none of the traditional tests for state action has been
discarded by the Supreme Court. Subsequent lower court applica-
tions of state action doctrine,' ° as well as scholarly comment,4
support this conclusion. In Community Medical Center v. Emer-
gency Medical Service., the Third Circuit provided this assess-
ment of the status of the symbiotic relationship, nexus, and public
function tests:
The relationship of these various tests to one another remains un-
clear, since the Supreme Court has not sought to reconcile appar-
ent inconsistencies between the tests; nor has it overruled earlier
precedents that seem unlikely to survive any of the tests that have
been propounded more recently.... Indeed, both Blum... and
Rendell-Baker.. ., the two most current discussions of state ac-
tion by the Supreme Court, treat all three forms of analysis as via-
39. The majority opinion in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), written by
Chief Justice Burger, was the most traditional in its approach to state action analysis.
Plaintiffs framed their state action claim in the context of the three traditional state action
tests, and the Chief Justice addressed the claim in that manner. In Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), Justice White, writing for the majority, suggested an umbrella
analytical framework to cover existing state action tests and to provide a uniform focus for
state action analysis, regardless of specific facts or circumstances. White characterized the
state action issue as a question of whether "the deprivation of a federal right (was] fairly
attributable to the State." Id. at 937. In order to meet the "fair attribution" test, White
said, "the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by
the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is
responsible," and "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly
be said to be a state actor." Id. White characterized the different state action tests used by
the Court in different contexts-public function, state compulsion, nexus, and joint ac-
tion--as means of identifying when a private party has become a state actor. Id. at 939. In
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority empha-
sized that the state had to be found "responsible for the specific conduct of which the plain-
tiff complains" for state action to be present. ICE at 1004 (emphasis in original). Justice
Rehnquist focused primarily on whether a nexus existed between the state and the chal-
lenged conduct, id. at 1004-10, but also addressed plaintiffs' symbiosis and government func-
tion arguments. Id. at 1010-12.
40. See, e.g., Lubin v. Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n, 713 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied,
104 S. Ct. 1282 (1984); Community Medical Center. v. Emergency Medical Servs., 712 F.2d
878 (3d Cir. 1983); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Adams v. Bain, 697
F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1982); Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Servs., 697 F.2d 447 (Ist Cir. 1983);
Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
41. See, e.g., Cobb, supra note 26; Comment, 8upra note 34; Case Note, Drawing New
Boundaries Between State Action and Section 1983's Action Under Color of State Law Re-
quirement: Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 36 ARK. L REV. 609 (1983). But c. Comment,
State Action and Chapter 766. Rendeil-Baker and the Demise of the Public Function Doc-
trine, 19 NEw ENG. L REV. 237 (1983) (asserting Rendeil-Baker virtually eliminated the
public function test).
42. 712 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1983).
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ble. However, as Judge Garth noted in dissent in Braden v.
University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d at 971-973, the recent authori-
ties, while not repudiating the Burton [symbiotic relationship] and
public function tests, have severely limited their applicability.
Nonetheless, all three remain valid, and we shall thus address in
turn their application to each argument advanced by CMC.4s
In the following paragraphs, conceptual and empirical defini-
tions of government function, symbiosis, and nexus will be dis-
cussed. The definitions presented are the ones most recently
enunciated and utilized by the Supreme Court and those currently
applied by lower courts in state action litigation. They are the def-
initions that later will be applied to broadcasting. It is important
to recognize, however, that when many of the broadcasting cases
discussed below were decided, these definitions had not yet
evolved.
A. Government Function
State action is present under the government or public function
theory when a private entity performs a function "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State."" An alternative conceptualiza-
tion is the private performance of a function that is "traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the state"4' or "traditionally associ-
ated with sovereignty."'  The exclusivity requirement, rather
than tradition, must be considered the key element in the defini-
tion in light of recent Supreme Court opinions.47
43. Id. at 880.
44. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,157 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
45. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. at 842 (emphasis in original). See Blum v. Yaret-
sky, 457 U.S. at 1011; Jackson v. Metrpolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 353.
46. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 353.
47. In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), the Court disavowed reliance on his-
tory or tradition in determining what constitutes a governmental function. '"o rely upon
the historical antecedents of a particular practice would result in the constitutional con-
demnation in one State of a remedy found perfectly permissible in another." Id. at 162-63.
"'(We are disinclined to decide the issue of state involvement on the basis of whether a
particular class of creditor did or did not enjoy the same freedom to act in Elizabethan or
Georgian England."' IS at 163 n.13 (quoting Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 203 (lst Cir.
1975)). See also Rendel-Baker, in which the Court drew attention to the word "exclusive"
by italicizing it, and went on to state that, despite a Massachusetts law providing public
funding for education programs for "maladjusted high school students," the law did not
make such services "the exclusive province of the State." 457 U.S. at 842.
Furthermore, in FMoog Bros the Court employed a two-pronged approach to the exclusiv-
ity requirement. First, the Court considered whether the function was one uniquely sover-
eign or administered with a great degree of exclusivity by the state. Second. the Court
inquired into the existence of alternative methods of performing the function and alterna-
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Empirically, the Supreme Court has found only the conduct of
elections and the operation of a company town to fall squarely
within the current definition of a public function."8 Conversely,
the Court has found that resolving private disputes,49 providing
utility services,' serving as counsel to a criminal defendant (even
though the attorney was a government-employed public de-
fender), 1 and operating shopping centers,' nursing homes," and
schools for problem high school students' are not exclusively gov-
ernmental functions.' In Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,M6 the Court
listed education, fire and police protection, and tax collection as
examples of functions that have been administered by the state
tive remedies for the complainant. 436 U.S. at 158-64. See also id at 172-73 n.8 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); 77&e Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 29, at 125; Note, Conahiutional
Law-State Acthon Defined Anew, 27 KAN. L. REv. 674 (1979).
48. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 158-59. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
49. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
50. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
51. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In Polk County, the Court held that a:
public defender, despite her status as a government employee, was not acting under color of
state law when performing "a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a [criminal] de-
fendant." Id. at 325. The Court said the lawyer served a "private function." Id at 319.
52. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
53. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
54. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
55. In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), the Court found state action in the opera-
tion of a whites-only park that had previously been under municipal control but was trans-
ferred to the management of private trustees in order to avoid desegregation. The main
basis for this decision was the municipality's alleged continued involvement in the manage-
ment and control of the park. Id at 301. The Court, however, buttressed its decision by
making reference to the municipal character and purpose of the park. The park was analo-
gized to the streets of a company town (Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)), to elections
(Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)), and to a transit system (Public Utils. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)). 382 U.S. at 301-02. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345 (1974), the Court cited Newton, along with Marsh and Terry, as examples of pri-
vate entities exercising "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." Id. at 352.
In Flagg Bros, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), however, the Court defined Newton as an involvement/
participation case and discounted its public function aspects. Id. at 159 n.8.
Respondents also contend that Evans v. Newton ... establishes that the opera-
tion of a park for recreational purposes is an exclusively public function. We
doubt that Newton intended to establish any such broad doctrine in the teeth of
the experience of several American entrepreneurs who amassed great fortunes by
operating parks for recreational purposes. We think Newton rests on a finding of
ordinary state action under extraordinary circumstanes.... [T]he transfer of
title to private trustees ... had not been shown to have eliminated the actual
involvement of the city in the daily maintenance and care of the park.
Id. In light of the Court's interpretation of Newton in Flag Bros, it appears that operation
of a park does not qualify as an exclusively governmental function.
56. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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with "a greater degree of exclusivity" than dispute resolution.51
The decision in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,MI though, places the status
of education as a state function in question. The Rendell-Baker
Court held that a privately owned school for problem students did
not perform a government function, despite a Massachusetts law
requiring the state to identify and provide programs for students
with special needs.59 The Court was careful, however, to confine
the public function discussion to "the education of maladjusted
high school students" and "students who could not be served by
traditional public schools."'  Most lower courts that have consid-
ered the issue, though, have held that private schools,"1 and pri-
vate security forces,62 as well as private health care institutions,;S
do not perform governmental functions. Lower courts have found
fire protection,"4 poll watching,' involuntary commitment and
confinement of the mentally ill,' and care of neglected children!
to be state functions. In all of those cases, however, statutes recog-
nizing some degree of state responsibility for the functions influ-
enced the state action holdings.
B. Symbiosis
While the government function theory analyzes and categorizes
the nature of the function performed by the private party, govern-
ment involvement/participation theory focuses on the relation-
57. Id. at 163.
58. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
59. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B, §§ 1-14 (West 1982).
60. 457 U.S. at 842.
61. See, e.g., Berrios v. Inter Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330 (1st Cir. 1976); Greenya v. George
Wash. Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.), cvrt denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975); Grafton v. Brooklyn
Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 488 F. Supp. 764 (D. Mass.
1980), cffd, 641 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1981), qffd, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
62. See cases cited supra note 23. But see People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d
1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979); People v. Eastway, 67 Mich. App. 464, 241 N.W.2d 249 (1976).
State action generally is found, though, when private security guards act in concert with
government officials or hold official government positions. See, e.g, Griffin v. Maryland.
378 U.S. 130 (1964); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Lucas v. United States, 4U
A.2d 360 (D.C. App. 1980).
63. See, e.g., Lubin v. Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n, 713 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied,
104 S. Ct. 1282 (1984); Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 971
(1979); Schlen v. Milford Hosp., Inc., 561 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1977); Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F.
Supp. 903 (D. Conn. 1979); Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.) qfl'd mere.,
506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974).
64. See Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1982); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volun-
teer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979).
65. See Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
66. See Ruffler v. Phelps Memorial Hosp., 453 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
67. See Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974).
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ship between government and the private entity. Government
involvement sufficient for a state action finding may take the form
of either a symbiotic relationship between government and the
private entity or a nexus between the specific challenged act and
government. Under the current definition of symbiosis, state ac-
tion is present when government and a private party are involved
in an overall relationship of interdependence in which govern-
ment becomes a partner or joint participant with the private
party." As conceptualized by the Supreme Court, symbiosis in-
volves three essential elements: a lessor-lessee relationship be-
tween government and a private party, the operation of a facility
open to the public, and the conferral of mutual benefits. 9 Symbi-
osis analysis is essentially additive. It entails identification of the
factual indicators of government entanglement, the sum of which
must be present before state action will be found.7" If a symbiotic
relationship is present, there is no need to prove that government
directly participated in the specific activity being challenged. The
government is considered a partner of the private party and,
therefore, jointly responsible for all of the private acts.
The Supreme Court has found a symbiotic relationship between
government and a private entity in only one case. The case was
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,7 in which William
Burton, a black, charged the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause was violated by the Eagle Coffee Shoppe's refusal to
serve him. The restaurant was located in leased space in a pub-
licly owned parking facility. The arrangement was financially
beneficial to both the restaurant owner and the government.72
68. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961).
69. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 175; Burton, 365 U.S. at
723-24.
70. In Burton, Justice Clark noted the additive nature of symbiosis. 365 U.S. at 724.
"Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of the Authority, the bene-
fits mutually conferred, together with the obvious fact that the restaurant is operated as an
integral part of a public building devoted to a public ... service" led to the state action
finding. Id. See also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 360-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71. 365 U.& 715 (1961). The Court did not use the term "symbiotic relationship" in
Burton. Eleven years later, in Moose Lodge No. 107, the Court first used that term to de-
scribe the Burton holding. 407 U.S. at 175.
72. 365 U.S. at 723-24. Arguably, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), also involved a
symbiotic relationship. See supra note 55. In Newton, the 100-acre park in Macon, Georgia
was created by a trust in Senator Augustus 0. Bacon's will, which provided that the city act
as trustee for the facility that was open only to whites. The Supreme Court found that,
after control was transferred to private trustees, there had been "no change in municipal
maintenance and concern over this facility." IE at 301. Although the Newton Court cited
No. 2] 277-
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The Court has declared emphatically that extensive government
regulation, government-granted monopoly status, and significant
government funding are insufficient to prove symbiosis.73
Lower courts have seldom found sufficient evidence of symbio-
sis to warrant a state action finding, except where ostensibly pri-
vate entities were actually arms or agencies of government, with
government officials involved in management or control. For ex-
ample, in Chalfant v. Wilmington Institute,4 the court declared
that an ostensibly private library was an "instrumentality of state
and local government. ' 75 The library received ninety percent of
its funds from taxes, enjoyed tax-exempt status, had government
officials on its board, was located on city-owned property under a
rent-free lease, and was subject to state law that defined the level
of library service and mandated the structure, organization, and
management of the board.76 In Downs v. Sawtelle,77 a symbiotic
relationship was identified between a municipality and a hospital.
Town officials selected the hospital's board of directors; if the hos-
pital were to close, all assets would revert to the town; hospital
profits were turned over to the town; the hospital was subject to
significant regulation; and thirty percent of the hospital's budget
came from Medicare funds.78  A few lower court symbiosis hold-
ings have been based largely on extensive government funding
Burton to support its holding, the state action analysis lacked the specificity, the mustering
of detail found in Burton. Rather than as an example of a symbiotic relationship, it seems
more appropriate to categorize Newton as a case of government attempting to mask its own
unconstitutional activity behind a nominal board of "private" trustees. That, perhaps, was
what Justice Rehnquist meant when he referred to Newton as a case of "ordinary state
action under extraordinary circumstances." Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 159 n.8. See
also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. at 842 n.7 (citing Newton and referring to "a sham
arrangement" whereby a state attempts to avoid its constitutional duties).
73. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1010-11 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 350-54 (1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 115 n.14 (1973);
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
74. 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978).
75. Id. at 745.
76. Id.
77. 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
78. 574 F.2d at 7. See also McVarish v. Mid-Nebraska Community Mental Health
Center, 696 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1982); Benner v. Oswald, 592 F.2d 174 (3d Cir.), cert denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Braden v. University
of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977); O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hosp.,
472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973). But cf. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073
(5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977) (no state action found when a student editor
of a state university newspaper refused to accept an ad where the editor was elected by the
students and no university officials participated in the challenged action).
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and regulation.' The Supreme Court's decision in Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn,' however, calls into question the rationale behind those
holdings. In Rendell-Baker, the Court held that a private school,
which received "virtually all [its] income ... from government
funding," was not involved in a symbiotic relationship with the
state.81
C. Nexus
The nexus test provides that state action is present when "a suf-
ficiently close nexus" or connection exists between government
and the specific activity being challenged. 2 A general relation-
ship between government and the private entity need not be
shown; a strong, clear link between government and the chal-
lenged conduct is sufficient. The nexus requirement has been de-
scribed as government placing its "imprimatur" on, 3 or "its own
weight on the side of,"" the challenged conduct. The Supreme
Court has found a nexus present where there is government com-
pulsion,85 encouragement s6 express approval,' and enforcement
of ss private actions or the actual participation of government offi-
cials with private parties.8 9 It is unclear whether all these forms
of a sufficient nexus have survived the Court's 1982 state action
rulings. In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.90 the Court held that joint
action by a government official and a private party is sufficient to
convert the private actor into a state actor.91 In addition, the
Lugar Court recognized "the 'state compulsion' test."92 In Blum
v. Yaretsky" the Court said that "normally" a nexus would be
79. See e.g., Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1976); Ginn v.
Mathews, 533 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1976); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
80. 457 U.S. 840 (1982).
81. Id. at 840, 843. See also Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 553 F. Supp. 675, 681-82 (N.D.N.Y.
1982).
82. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974).
83. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948).
84. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 357.
85. See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963).
86. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 367 U.S. 369 (1967); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153
(1964).
87. See Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
88. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
89. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 396
U.S. 144 (1970).
90. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
91. Id. at 94L
92. I at 939.
9. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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present "only when [the state] has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert,
that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.""
The definition in Blum was repeated with approval in Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn.95 In Rendell-Baker the Court also acknowledged
that state and federal regulations at issue in Blum "encouraged"
the private parties to perform the challenged acts." Apparently,
though, that government encouragement was not significant
enough to meet the nexus requirement. The Court also has said
that "[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a pri-
vate party,"' ' government authorization of private choice," and
failure to disapprove (or pro forma approval) of private practices"
are not sufficient evidence of a nexus. The message of the
Supreme Court's recent state action cases seems to be that usually
a nexus will be found only when the initiative or impetus for the
challenged action comes from government or when government
officials participate in the challenged activity. Nevertheless, de-
spite some effort to distinguish earlier cases, the Court has neither
overruled, nor directly attacked on their merits, the more liberal
involvement/participation holdings of the Vinson and Warren
Courts.1°° Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, it will be as-
sumed that while government pressure or actual participation is
most likely to result in a nexus finding, other manifestations of
government involvement, as illustrated by earlier cases, may still
be offered as proof of state action.
Empirically speaking, the Supreme Court has found the nexus
requirement met by: state laws and regulations requiring or en-
couraging racial discrimination;101 statements of public officials di-
recting private individuals to engage in segregation;10 2 judicial
94. Id. at 1004.
95. 457 U.S. at 839-40.
96. 1& at 841.
97. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004.
98. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978).
99. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974); CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118 (1973).
100. Cobb, supra note 26, at 534-35. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), did ex-
pressly overrule Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), but those cases involved the government function thread of state
action.
101. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Peterson v. City of Greenville,
373 U.S. 244 (1963).
102. See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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enforcement of privately devised restrictive covenants;103 a police
officer and private party conspiring to have a white woman ar-
rested for attempting to eat at a lunch counter with black stu-
dents;104 express government approval, following hearings and
investigation, of a transit company's decision to pipe radio pro-
grams into buses;105 and government officials participating in the
execution of an ex parte prejudgment attachment of a debtor's
property.1l" It should be emphasized, however, that in all but two
of those cases,"° racial discrimination was the impetus for the
challenged private activity. Although the Supreme Court has
never indicated that state action standards should be applied dif-.
ferently depending on the right being asserted, courts have histor-
ically been more willing to apply constitutional provisions to
private racial discrimination than to claims of lack of procedural
due process or violations of free speech and press rights.'0l The
Supreme Court has failed to find its nexus definition met by: a
state law permitting private choice in debtor-creditor controver-
sies;10 9 government failure to disapprove of a utility's termination
policy,"10 or broadcasters' policies on editorial advertising;"' judi-
cial application of neutral property laws that permitted establish-
ment of racially discriminatory trusts;112 government policies
encouraging transfer of nursing home patients to lower-cost,
lesser-care facilities;" 3 and state regulation of a private school that
neither compelled nor influenced the challenged personnel deci-
sions."' Lower courts most frequently have found a nexus when
government officials have cooperated or participated with private
individuals in the performance of a particular act or in the making
103. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
104. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
105. See Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
106. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
107. Id.; Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
108. See Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739,755 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J., dissent-
Ing); Taylor v. Consolidated Edison Co., 552 F.2d 39, 42-46 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S.
845 (1977); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397,406 (2d Cir. 1975); Greco v. Orange Memo-
rial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 879-82 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.. 1000 (1975); Jackson v.
Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 628 (2d Cir. 1974); Black, supra note 19, at 84-85; Friendly, The
Public.Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289, 1291 (1982);
Note, supra note 9, at 658.
109. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
110. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 US. 345 (1974).
111. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.& 94 (1973).
112. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
113. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
114. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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The government or state action question is a threshold issue.
Because first amendment prohibitions apply only to government,
before determining whether the challenged action constitutes an
abridgement of free expression, a court must first examine
whether the constitutional provision invoked applies to the de-
fendant." 6 This threshold question of state action has been the
nemesis of most litigants seeking to convince courts that broad-
caster censorship or access denials violate the first amendment." 7
Over the years, litigants have invoked all three major state ac-
tion theories in broadcasting cases. Government function theory
'has been the least used, and no court has ever accepted the argu-
ment that broadcasters perform a governmental function. In only
a few cases have courts found evidence of sufficient extraordinary
115. See, e.g., Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1982); Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681
F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982); Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir.
1982), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 302 (1983); Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607
F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980). Q. Madry v. Sorel, 558 F.2d 303
(5th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536
F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); Lemberos v. Laurel Racecourse,
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Md. 1980) (no state action found in these cases because state
officials did not actually participate in the challenged conduct).
116. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973) (the Court's inabil-
ity to agree on the state action question forced Chief Justice Burger, writing for the major-
ity, to determine "whether, assuming governmental action," the broadcasters' actions
violated the first amendment). The Chief Justice's opinion in CBS consisted of four parts,
but only Parts I, II and IV constituted the opinion of the Court. Part I stressed that first
amendment questions relating to broadcasting should be evaluated within the framework
of the broadcast regulatory scheme. Part II concluded that the Communications Act of
1934 was designed to allow journalistic discretion. In Part III, the Chief Justice found gov-
ernment action lacking, but only Justices Stewart and Rehnquist concurred in that portion
of the opinion. Since a majority of the Court refused to dismiss the constitutional claims
against the broadcasters on the ground that there was no state action, Part IV of the opin-
ion went on to declare that even assuming government action, the first amendment did not
require broacasters to accept editorial ads. See also Belluso v. Turner Communications
Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980); Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d 384
(2d Cir. 1977); Central N.Y. Right to Life Fed'n v. Radio Station WIBX, 479 F. Supp. 8
(N.D.N.Y. 1979); Moro v. Telemundo, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 920 (D.P.R. 1974) (the courts in
these cases failed to find government action and, therefore, never went on to address the
merits of the first amendment claims against the broadcasters).
117. See, e.g., Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980);
Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1977); McIntire v. William
Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946); Levitch
v. CBS, 495 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), fffd, 697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983); Central N.Y.
Right to Life Fed'n v. Radio Station WIBX, 479 F. Supp. 8 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); Moro v.
Telemundo, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 920 (D.P.R. 1974); Smothers v. CBS, 351 F. Supp. 622 (C.D.
Cal. 1972); Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Massachusetts Universalist
Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 87 F. Supp. 822 (D. Mass. 1949), qffd, 183 F.2d 497
(1st Cir. 1950).
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government involvement with broadcasters to support a finding of
state action through the government involvement/participation
concept.1 ' The key word is extraordinary. In general, courts
have held that government licensing and regulation alone are in-
sufficient to meet the symbiosis test.1 9 Instead, courts have de-
manded evidence of explicit government approval of or pressure
to perform the challenged conduct-in other words, the existence
of a nexus between government and the challenged broadcaster
actions.' The remainder of this article will be devoted to explor-
ing the applicability of the state action definitions to broadcasting.
First, the two earliest claims of first amendment violations by
broadcasters will be described briefly. Then, the government
function, symbiosis, and nexus theories will be discussed in turn.
Within the discussion of each theory, some of the government ac-
tion arguments of plaintiffs who have brought constitutional
claims against broadcasters and the courts' responses to those ar-
guments will be reviewed. Finally, the applicability of existing




In 1973 Lange noted that courts generally have approached con-
stitutional claims against broadcasters with "a rather firm pre-
sumption against a finding of state action."112 1 Perhaps one reason
for this "firm presumption" is that disgruntled access-seekers
were too visionary, or too premature, in their initial approaches to
the federal judiciary, leading to the establishment of a no-state-
action precedent in broadcasting before the Supreme Court had
begun development of state action doctrine. The first case involv-
118. See Writers Guild of Am. West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); Busi-
ness Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub
nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broad-
casting Co., 424 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Conn. 1976), rev'd, 566 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1977).
119. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 350-52; CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 115 n.15; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. at 173.
120. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp. 633 F.2d at 399-400; Kuczo v. Western
Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d at 388; Levltch v. CBS, 495 F. Supp. at 657-58; Central N.Y.
Right to Life Fed'n v. Radio Station WIBX, 479 F. Supp. at 11; Gemini Enters. v. WFMY
Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 568 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
121. Lange, supra note 4, at 28.
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ing a state action claim against a broadcaster'2 2 predated the two
Supreme Court cases generally considered to be the leading
sources of the involvement/participation and public function theo-
ries of state action.1
2
In Mclntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co.,' clergymen
and religious organizations contended that a radio station's refusal
to continue to sell them time violated their first amendment
rights. In 1948, this was apparently a novel and "somewhat incom-
prehensible argument for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
which flatly declared that Penn was a private corporation, not a
government agency, and, therefore, not subject to first amend-
ment prohibitions.' The court did not discuss the nature of the
function performed by radio, government involvement through li-
censing regulation, or the FCC's'participation or lack of participa-
tion in the broadcaster's decision. Thirty years later, McIntire was
still being cited to support no-state-action decisions in broadcast-
ing cases, despite the development of state action doctrine in the
intervening years.'
Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers
Co.127 was the next government action case involving a broad-
caster. By the time it was decided in 1949, the Supreme Court had
enunciated and applied both the public function and government
involvement theories of state action to declare private actions un-
constitutional. However, in a decision later affirmed and re-
printed verbatim by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Massachusetts Federal District Court disposed of plaintiff's first
amendment claim in one sentence: "But this Amendment limits
only the action of Congress or of agencies of the federal govern-
ment and not private corporations such as defendant here."''1
Like McIntire, Massachusetts Univeralist Convention also re-
sulted from a controversy over religious programming. The con-
vention had a contract with station WLAW, Lawrence, Kansas, to
broadcast a series of sermons. The contract provided, however,
that all broadcasts were "subject to the approval of the station
122. McIntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert denied,
327 U.S. 779 (1946).
123. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
124. 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946).
125. 151 F.2d at 601.
126. See, e.g., Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d at 387; Moro v.
Telemundo, Inc. 387 F. Supp. at 924.
127. 87 F. Supp. 822 (D. Mass. 1949), affd, 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950).
128. Id. at 825.
[Vol. 7
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
both as to artists and broadcast content.'" The Universalists ap-
parently did not accept the resurrection of Jesus Christ as fact but
as a story of "purely metaphorical or spiritual significance."'" On
Easter 1949, the convention wanted to broadcast a sermon expres-
sing those views, but WLAW refused because the sermon would
"be shocking to general public sensibility."'' The courts failed to
find the first amendment applicable to the broadcaster's decision.
Nearly two decades elapsed before another case involving al-
leged constitutional violations by a broadcaster was reported by a
federal court. By the late 1960's, a significant body of state action
precedent had been established. Plaintiffs and their attorneys
drew on these precedents and began demonstrating remarkable
ingenuity in building state action arguments. Judges began engag-
ing in detailed analyses of such claims and applying state action
definitions and criteria developed in other contexts to privately
owned radio and televison.
IV
Broadcasters and Government Function Theory
Unlike the involvement/participation theories that were devel-
oped in the context of private racial discrimination, the govern-
ment function concept of state action has a first amendment
history. In the classic case of Marsh v. Alabama,'u the Supreme
Court held that a company town's refusal to allow Grace Marsh to
distribute religious literature on the town's sidewalks violated the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of press and religion. Cited
continually for both its holding and expansive language, Marsh de-
clared that because the private property of the company town
served a public function, its operation was subject to constitutional
restraints.133
Marsh and its broad public function language played a pivotal
role in later first amendment cases resulting from the attempts of
privately owned shopping centers to restrict picketing and leaflet-
ing on their property. In a series of three shopping center cases
spanning eight years, however, the Supreme Court moved from an
expansive interpretation of Marsh to a much more restricted defi-
129. Id. at 823.
130. l.
131. Id
132. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
133. Id. at 506.08.
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nition of government function.13 ' In Amalgamated Food Employ-
ees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,x" the Warren
Court found the shopping center "clearly the functional
equivalent of the business district ... in Marsh."'1'  The shop-
ping center's refusal to allow peaceful union picketing violated the
first amendment. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,"s involving anti-Viet-
nam War leafleters, the Warren Court said Logan Valley was in-
applicable because the "message sought to be conveyed by
respondents was directed to all members of the public, not solely
to patrons of Lloyd Center or of any of its operations"' ' and the
leafleters had access to "alternative avenues of communica-
tion."'139 Finally, in Hudgens v. NLRB,140 another case involving
union picketing at a shopping center, the Court expressly over-
ruled Logan Valley."
A. The Cases
Despite its early history of helping communicators gain access
to audiences, government function theory seldomly has been used
or usefuiAn broadcast access cases. In a 1971 case, Post v. Pay-
ton,142 plaintiffs, members of the staff and listening audience of
two radio stations operated by Long Island University, tried an im-
aginative, but unsuccessful, approach. The suit resulted from the
closing of the stations and the firing of director Steven Post due to
the alleged broadcast of obscenities. Plaintiffs contended that
FCC licensing of broadcasters was analogous to United States Post
Office licensing of private parties to deliver mail."43 Plaintiffs ap-
parently argued that mail delivery and broadcasting were "func-
tionally equivalent" methods of disseminating information, an
approach most likely based on the Supreme Court's language in
Logan Valley.'" The district court, however, refused to consider
broadcasting a government function without some indication that
134. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Uloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 .7
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968).
135. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
136. Id. at 318.
137. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
138. Id at 564.
139. Id. at 566-67.
140. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
141. Id at 518.
142. 323 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
143. 1d at 803-04.
144. 391 U.S. at 318.
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Congress intended or mandated federal performance of that
function.1 5
When Tom and Dick Smothers sued CBS in 1972, charging that
the network violated their constitutional rights by censoring and
deleting material from their Smothers Brothers Show, they based
their state action argument primarily on the symbiotic relation-
ship theory.14 The court, however, seemed to read a public func-
tion requirement into the symbiosis theory, declaring that no
matter how close or comprehensive the relationship between the
FCC and CBS, it was nonetheless insufficient to "overcome the
requirement that the private party must be performing functions
that normally would be performed by the government or state.
1 41
This commingling of two distinct threads of state action theory
was an unusual approach. Indeed, in Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority,'" the only Supreme Court case in which state ac-
tion was found because of a symbiotic relationship, the private
defendant was engaged in operating a restaurant, hardly a func-
tion that is traditionally performed exclusively by government.
B. Applicability of Government Function Theory to Broadcasters
It is not surprising that government function theory has played
such a limited role in state action cases involving broadcasters. In
the United States, broadcasting simply is not a function that is tra-
ditionally and exclusively reserved to the federal government.14 9
Historically, broadcasting has been primarily a private enterprise.
For example, in 1926, immediately prior to enactment of the first
145. 323 F. Supp. at 803-04.
146. Smothers v. CBS, 351 F. Supp. 622 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
147. Id. at 626 n.6.
148. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
149. In most other nations, of course, broadcasting is a function performed by the gov-
ernment. See generally MASS CoMMCATIONs: A WoRLD VIEW (A. Wells ed. 1974). In
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Supreme Court acknowledged this
fact but treated it as irrelevant in light of the private broadcasting system expressly author-
ized by Congress.
[W]ith the advent of radio a half century ago, Congress was faced with a funds.
mental choice between total Government ownership and control of the new me-
dium-the choice of most other countries-or some other alternative. Long before
the impact and potential of the medium was realized, Congress opted for a system
of private broadcasters licensed and regulated by Government. The legislative his-
tory suggests that this choice was influenced not only by traditional attitudes to-
ward private enterprise, but by a desire to maintain for licensees, so far as
consistent with necessary regulation, a traditional journalistic role.
d. at 116.
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comprehensive radio regulation,"' ° the majority of radio stations
were owned by private, profit-making entities, such as stores,
manufacturers, and publishers.151
Moreover, broadcasting cannot be considered a government
function by virtue of legislation. At times, courts have found the
government function test met by legislation through which gov-
ernment assumed exclusive control over a particular function. 52
However, the legislative history of broadcast regulation provides
no evidence that Congress intended to declare broadcasting as a
whole the exclusive prerogative of government. Instead, legisla-
tive records make it clear that Congress envisioned a system of
largely private broadcasters subject to federal regulation.5 ' The
stated purposes of the Communications Act of 19341"4 are, "among
other things, to maintain the control of the United States over all
the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission, and to
provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership
thereof, by persons for limited periods of time."'' Of course, one
possible interpretation of the maintenance-of-control language is
that Congress assumed for itself the power to use all broadcast
150. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
151. Fifty-seven percent of the 379 stations reporting were owned by private, profit-
making entities: stores, 124 stations (33%); publishers, 35 stations (9%); manufacturers, 30
stations (8%); banks and insurance companies, 15 stations (4%); and hotels, 12 stations
(3%). Schools and colleges, some of which were private, owned 94 stations (25%), while the
remaining stations were owned by churches, societies, municipalities, counties, and states.
Radio Contro" Hearings on S. I and S. 1754 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Com-
merce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1926) (statement of Stephen B. Davis, Commerce Dep't
Solicitor).
152. See Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1982); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volun-
teer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979); Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Ruffler v. Phelps Memorial Hosp., 453 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
153. The legislative histories of the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), and
the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982), are extensive. Sources used for
this study included Federal Communications Commission, Hearings on S. 2910 Before the
Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Hearings on H.R. 8301 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Radio Broadcasting, Hearings on H.R 7986
Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine, Radio and Fisheries, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934); To Regulate Radio Communication, Hearings on H.R. 5589 Before the House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); Radio Control, supra note
151; S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Seas. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934); S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); H.R. REP. No. 404,69th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1926); 78 CONG. REC. 8822-37, 8842-4, 10,306-10, 10,312-19, 10,322-28 (1934); 68 CONG. REC.
2556-80, 2582, 2588-90, 2750-51, 2869-82, 3025-39, 3117-24, 3257-62, 3329-36, 3569-71, 4109-14,
4148-55 (1927); 67 CONG. REC. 5473-504, 5555-86, 5645-47, 12,335-59, 12,497-508, 12,614-18
(1926).
154. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
155. Id § 301.
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frequencies in the United States. Under this interpretation, oper-
ating a broadcast station is, by legislation, the exclusive preroga-
tive of the federal government, but a prerogative Congress chose
to delegate to private parties. Such a situation would be analogous
to that of Ruffler v. Phelps Memorial Hospita,1 56 in which the
court found commitment and treatment of the mentally ill was, by
statute, an exclusive state function, but one that New York had
delegated to private mental institutions.
Yet, both the legislative history of broadcast legislation and its
application and interpretation for more than fifty years indicate
that the maintenance-of-control language was designed primarily
to establish and justify federal power to regulate, not operate,
broadcast stations. According to Senator Clarence C. Dill, a pri-
mary author of the Radio Act of 1927,157 "The real point in this bill
is the right and power to control the apparatus that sends out the
frequencies and makes what is known as radio."'" Senator Dill
did not use the word "operate." Indeed, much of the debate over
the Radio Act centered on a justification for federal regulation,
with some arguing that Congress should declare "the ether within
the United States . . . the inalienable possession of the people
thereof.' 5 9 Dill contended the justification for radio regulation
stemmed from Congress's constitutional power to regulate inter-
state commerce.1l 0 In the end, the stated purposes of the Radio
Act were:
to regulate all forms of interstate and foreign radio transmissions
and communications within the United States, its Territories and
possessions; to maintain the control of the United States over all
the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to
provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership
thereof, by individuals, firms, or corporations, for limited periods
of time.' 61
Not only did the final version of the Act explicitly declare regu-
lation to be Congress's intent, it also referred to the use of chan-
nels by "individuals, firms, or corporations," a clear indication that
156. 453 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
157. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
158. 68 CONG. REc. 2873 (1927) (statement of Senator Dill) (emphasis added).
159. The language is found in S. 1754, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1926), Radio Contro,
supra note 151, at 1. See also S. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1936), and H.R. 5589,69th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 1 (1926); To Regulate Radio Communicatio, supra note 153, at 1. For discussion
of the ownership of the airwaves concept, see To Regulate Radio Communication, 8upiu
note 153, at 21-25, 88-91; 68 CoNG. REc. 2869-81 (1927); 67 CONG. REc. 5487 (1926).
160. 68 CONG. REc. 3119 (1927); 67 CONG. REc. 5502 (1926).
161. Ch. 169, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (emphasis added).
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Congress envisioned private performance of the broadcasting
function. In the Communications Act of 1934, the clause on regu-
latory purpose was altered to include regulation of wire communi-
cation and became an introduction to the entire Act.16 2 The
clauses on maintenance of federal control and use, but not owner-
ship, by private parties were altered slightly and became the intro-
duction to the broadcast regulation portions of the Act.1 s'
While broadcasting traditionally has been a private activity, the
content and legislative history of the Communications Act, as dis-
cussed above, as well as the interpretation and application of the
Act, make it clear that broadcast regulation is an exclusive func-
tion of the federal government. 1' 4 Presumably then, the private
exercise of this regulatory function could raise constitutional im-
plications. This was one of the issues in a complex 1976 case,
Writers Guild of America West, Inc. v. FCC,'65 which arose when
a group of television writers, actors, directors, and producers sued
the FCC, the major commercial networks, and the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters, challenging the so-called family viewing
policy on statutory and constitutional grounds. The policy,
adopted by the networks and the NAB after significant pressure
by the FCC, provided that during the first hour of prime time net-
work programming and the immediately preceding hour, only pro-
grams appropriate for a general audience should be shown.
Plaintiffs urged application of government function theory, con-
tending that network-NAB domination of broadcasting resulted in
broadcast regulation by private parties. By permitting and en-
couraging rulemaking and enforcement by the networks and the
NAB, plaintiffs argued, the FCC implicitly delegated a function
exclusively reserved to itself."e While recognizing plaintiffs' pub-
lic function contentions, the district court nonetheless chose to
base its state action finding on the nexus theory, replete as the
case was with evidence of the government having exerted signifi-
162. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
163. Id § 301.
164. "By [the Radio Act of 1927] Congress, in order to protect the national interest in-
volved in the new and far-reaching science of broadcasting, formulated a unified and com-
prehensive regulatory system for the industry." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309
U.S. 134, 137 (1940) (emphasis added). See also Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 535
(1959); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943); Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v.
Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 1950).
165. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1975), vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).




The contention that the NAB assumed governmental powers
through adoption of its Radio and Television Codes'" was not
new, nor did it end with Writers Guild."'69 However, because
Writers Guild did not thoroughly analyze plaintiffs' government
function arguments, it failed to address the most basic question
relative to the applicability of government function theory to the
private assumption of broadcast regulatory functions: what activi-
ties can be classified as regulatory functions or powers exclusively
reserved to the federal government? Clearly, such activities as
channel allocation, license conferral, renewal and denial, and the
imposition of penalities, including forfeitures, suspensions, and
revocations, are regulatory functions specifically delegated to the
FCC by law. 7 ° But most cases involving constitutional challenges
to broadcaster action stem from programming decisions not easily
recognized as regulatory activities. The Communications Act does
not give the FCC power to make specific programming decisions
for individual stations. Whatever programming power the FCC
possesses is general in nature and stems from provisions such as:
the Communications Act's public interest standard;171 sections 315
and 312;172 and prohibitions on the broadcasting of lottery infor-
mation,17  fraudulent material, 174 and obscene or indecent lan-
guage.175 The Commission has exercised its general authority
167. Id. at 1145. Writers Guild was vacated and remanded by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, largely on the ground that the FCC had primary jurisdiction over the claims
against itself and individual commissioners. However, the appeals court also questioned
the district court's state action finding. 609 F.2d 355, 361.
168. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, NAB TELEVISION CODE, NAB RADIO
CODE (22d ed. 1981), in BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 1982, at D-15 to -22. In January 1983, the
NAB voted to repeal officially both the Television and Radio Codes and dissolve its code
boards as a result of both the Writers Guild action and an antitrust action challenging
portions of the Television Code. In 1979, the Justice Department filed an antitrust suit
against the NAB, charging certain advertising provisions of the Television Code were anti-
competitive. In 1982, the NAB signed a consent agreement with the Justice Department,
agreeing not to maintain, publish, distribute, or enforce certain advertising provisions. See
United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 538 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C.),final judgement
entered, 553 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1982); NAB Codes gone but not forgotten, BROADCASTING,
Jan. 19, 1983, at 37.
169. See Mark v. FCC, 468 F.2d 266 (lst Cir. 1972); Gemini Enters. v. WFMY Television
Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559 (M.D.N.C. 1979); Note, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation
Under the First Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1527, 1550-53 (1975).
170. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 308, 309, 312, 501, 502, 503 (1982).
171. Id. §§ 303, 307(a).
172. Id. §§ 315, 312.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1304; 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(6), 503(b)(D) (1982).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(6), 503(b)(D) (1982).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1464; 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(6), 503(b)(D) (1982).
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over programming through such mechanisms as the fairness doc-
trine,17 the prime time access rule,177 and general policy state-
ments on programming. 7 8 The Communications Act, however,
specifically denies the FCC power to censor the "radio communi-
cations or signals transmitted by any radio station."'1 79 Thus, in
the area of programming, the Commission's regulatory powers
and functions include formulation of general rules, policies, and
guidelines designed to meet the requirements of the Communica-
tions Act. Individual programming decisions and censorhip, how-
ever, clearly are not regulatory functions.
At first glance, then, it might appear that the Writers Guild
plaintiffs' public function argument had some merit because the
family hour constituted a general programming policy, rather
than an individual programming decision. Yet, a key aspect of the
FCC's exclusive regulatory power is the ability to command ad-
herence to rules and policies and to impose sanctions, ranging
from chastisement to license revocation for violations. NAB
membership, however, is voluntary. While membership may
carry significant benefits, it is not required to maintain a broadcast
license. It would appear, then, that the adoption of rules or poli-
cies by voluntary associations, such as the NAB, would not consti-
tute the assumption of a traditionally exclusive function of the
FCC since, unlike the FCC, the NAB cannot make maintenance of
a broadcast license contingent upon adherence to its rules.i' °
Thus, unless the FCC were to assign its responsibility for licensing
or sanctioning errant broadcasters to the NAB or some other pri-
vate entity, government function theory is no more applicable to
broadcast self-regulation than it would be to a church that binds
its members under pain of excommunication to obey church rules
that cover areas within the legitimate police power of the state.
In addition, the Supreme Court's use of a two-pronged exclusiv-
176. 47 C.F.R. § 1910 (1983). See also The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1
(1974); Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance (Fairness Primer), 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964); Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
177. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1983).
178. E.g., En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960); Editorializing by Broad-
cast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949); Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees
(Blue Book) (1946).
179. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982).
180. Much of the debate and controversy over alleged NAB assumption of governmen-
tal functions and power has dissipated, of course, as a result of the repeal of the NAB Radio
and Television Codes. See supra note 168.
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ity test l"1 in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks"82 further erodes the argu-
ment that private efforts to control or affect the content of
broadcast programming constitute regulation and, therefore, gov-
ernment action. In Flagg Brothers, the Court considered not only
whether the function was an exclusively sovereign one, but also
whether alternative methods of performing the function existed.
The FCC's oft-noted "raised eyebrow" approach to regulation'"
indicates the Commission historically has viewed self-regulation
by broadcasters as a feasible, and at times, preferable, alternative
to government regulation.' 8" The FCC's 1974 Children's Televi-
sion, Report and Policy Statement,' 5m for example, explicitly uti-
lized this approach, noting with approval industry efforts to limit
commercials in children's programming, and lauding self-regula-
tion as a more effective control than government regulation.'"
The Writers Guild litigation, of course, resulted from the FCC's
efforts to convince broadcasters to self-regulate with regard to sex
and violence in programming.8 7
Now the FCC espouses another alternative to government regu-
lation-marketplace control. The termination of the children's
television proceeding and the effective rescission of the 1974 Chil-
dren's Television Policy Statement is but one recent example of
the FCC's current emphasis on control through marketplace
forces.' Others include radio deregulation,'8 9 deregulation of tel-
evision,19° removal of many structural and programming require-
181. See supra note 47.
182. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
183. See D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTINGS 449-92 (1979).
184. See, e.g., Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28
F.C.C.2d 409, reconsid, 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971), a classic example of the "raised eyebrow"
approach, in which the FCC, responding to concerns over the broadcast of records with
drug-related lyrics, reminded broadcasters of their responsibility to know the content of
material they broadcast. Although some broadcasters viewed the statement as an FCC at-
tempt at illegal censorship, the D.C. Court of Appeals did not. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
185. 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), reconaid denied, 55 F.C.C.2d 691 (1975), offd sub nom. Action
for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
186. 50 F.C.C.2d at 12-18.
187. 423 F. Supp. at 1092-1128.
188. Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d 634
(1983).
189. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, reconsid granted in part 87 F.C.C.2d 797
(1981), qffd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
190. See Deregulation comea to television, BROADCASTING, July 2 1984, at 31.
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ments on over-the-air subscription television, 191 refusal to impose
special programming requirements on Direct Broadcast Satel-
lites'92 or Low Power Television,' and FCC proposals to elimi-
nate the fairness doctrine and access requirements for political
candidates.'" The FCC's continuing support of, and, at times, ac-
tive search for, alternatives to government regulation of content,
coupled with the inability of private entitites to coerce broadcaster
adherence to programming policies, indicate privately devised pro-




Of the three types of state action, the symbiotic relationship the-
ory has had the greatest facial appeal for persons seeking or sup-
porting a constitutional right of access to broadcast channels. If an
overall relationship of interdependence and joint participation ex-
ists between the federal government and broadcasters, then all ac-
tions taken by broadcasters can be deemed state action, without
searching for a direct link between government and the chal-
lenged action. The public ownership of the airwaves concept,
designation of broadcast licensees as fiduciaries or proxies of the
public, and government licensing and regulation, prompted sev-
eral commentators in the 1970's, including an FCC commissioner,
to argue that symbiosis was present in the relationship between
the federal government and broadcasters. 95
Early Supreme Court state action decisions, coupled with the
Court's expansive dicta in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC' 96
upholding the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, lent sup-
port to that position. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,"9
two citizens alleged that the District of Columbia's Capital Transit
Co. violated their first and fifth amendment rights by piping radio
programs into buses and streetcars. In finding state action present
191. Subscription Television Service, 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982), reconsid denied, 53 RAD.
REG. (P & F) 646 (1983).
192. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 709-11 (1982).
193. Low Power Television Serv., 51 RAD. REG. (P & F) 476, 518-20 (1982).
194. See supra note 1.
195. E.g., Johnson & Westen, supra note 4; Malone, supra note 4; Comment, A Public
Right of Access to the Broadcasting Media: Its Present and Future State After Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 19 S.D.L. REV. 167 (1974).
196. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
197. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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in the conduct of that privately owned transit company, the Court
noted that Capital Transit operated a public utility under the au-
thority of Congress, enjoyed a federally authorized monopoly over
mass transit, and was subject to the regulatory supervision of the
Public Utilities Commission. 9 ' In Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority,19 the Court held unconstitutional a privately oper-
ated restaurant's refusal to serve blacks. Burton, which became
the cornerstone for many state action claims during the next
twenty years, involved a restaurant located in a government
owned and operated parking facility. The Court emphasized the
private use of public property, the financial benefits accruing to
both the restaurant and parking facility from the arrangement,
and the failure of the governmental body to prohibit the chal-
lenged conduct.2' The early state action cases, read in conjunc-
tion with Red Lion's emphasis on the scarcity rationale and
resulting monopoly status of licensees, audience rights, fiduciary
responsibilities of broadcasters, and the FCC's power to compel
licensees to share their frequencies with the public,20' seemed to
support a symbiosis finding.
Those supporting state action via the symbiosis theory failed to
reckon with two extremely significant factors: the judiciary's
strong concern with the protection of journalistic discretion and
broadcaster independence, and the evolutionary nature of state ac-
tion doctrine. In the only broadcasting state action case the
Supreme Court has considered, Chief Justice Burger stated that
the key distinction between Pollak and cases involving broadcast-
ers is that broadcasters, unlike transit companies, are guaranteed
journalistic discretion and protection by the Communications Act
and the first amendment. 2 Furthermore, by the 1970's, the Bur-
ger Court was reinterpreting earlier state action cases in line with
its general emphasis on the development of conceptual definitions
of the various forms of state action. The symbiosis aspects of Pol-
lak, which also involved Public Utilities Commission approval of
the piped-in music, were discounted, and instead Pollack was
viewed as a nexus case.203 Burton was interpreted as containing
three critical elements in support of the symbiosis finding: the les-
sor-lessee relationship, the conferral of mutual benefits, and the
198. Id at 462.
199. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
200. 1I at 723-24.
201. 395 U.S. at 386-400.
202. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120 (1973).
203. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 356-57 (1974).
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public nature of both the restaurant and the building in which it
was housed.2°4 In 1974, the Supreme Court clearly declared that
even "extensive and detailed" regulation and government-granted
monopoly status were not sufficient to prove state action.
°5
A. The Cases
Despite the questionable applicability of symbiosis theory to
broadcasting today, most suits against broadcasters involving con-
stitutional issues have raised the symbiosis argument. Only once,
however, has a federal court indicated any willingness to accept
the overall relationship between government and broadcasters as
being adequate to clear the state action hurdle. More commonly,
courts either have rejected the applicability of symbiosis theory or
have acknowledged its possible relevance but based their decisions
on the nexus concept.
In Ackerman v. CBS, 2  a psychiatrist and a psychologist sued
the three commercial television networks for allegedly failing to
provide 1968 presidential candidate Dick Gregory with broadcast
time comparable to that given Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey,
and George Wallace. Ackerman was the first case in which a fed-
eral court demonstrated receptiveness to a government action
claim against a broadcaster. Federal District Court Judge Wein-
feld said he would assume the conduct of the three networks "par-
takes of 'public action' by virtue of their status as entities
regulated by a federal administrative body, as associations of fed-
erally licensed broadcasters and as grantees of a federal proprie-
tary interest held in trust for the public.""°7 Ackerman, however,
preceded Burger Court redefinitions of state action and, most im-
portantly, involved only an assumption of government action, not
a finding. The Ackerman plaintiffs brought suit under a federal
statute granting district courts original jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing alleged deprivations of constitutional rights performed under
color of state law,208 a requirement equivalent to state action.2 9
As Judge Weinfeld noted, even assuming government action, the
204. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
205. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-52.
206. 301 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
207. Id. at 632.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982).
209. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Supreme Court said the "under color of state law"
requirement of federal civil rights legislation "is the same question posed in cases arising
under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights 'fairly at-
tributable to the state?"' 457 U.S. at 838 (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
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conduct was of a federal, not a state, nature.1l Plaintiffs had cho-
sen the wrong grounds for their suit, and the action was dismissed.
Two years later, in Post v. Payton,21 1 a New York federal court
declared that the decision of a broadcaster to close two radio sta-
tions and fire the stations' director involved neither state nor fed-
eral action. The stations were licensed to the C.W. Post Center, a
division of Long Island University, a private school. Citing Bur-
ton, the court said there was no indication that "the State is in any
way involved in the affairs of C.W. Post Center, much less that the
State has so insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with the Center that the actions of the trustees thereof become
'state action.' ",212 McIntire v. William Penn Broascasting Co. 21 1
and Massachsetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers
Co.,214 the two earliest cases considering constitutional claims
against broadcasters, were used to reject the claim of federal ac-
tion." 5 Ackerman was dismissed in a footnote as merely assum-
ing, arguendo, "that such conduct partook of 'public action.' 216
The court also said plaintiffs' reliance on Red Lion dicta was "mis-
placed," since Red Lion "did not hold that the licensee's actions
were governmental action.
2 1 7
By far the most extensive discussion of the applicability of sym-
biosis theory to broadcasting occurred in the 1971 case of Business
Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC,218 reversed by the
Supreme Court two years later under the title CBS v. Democratic
National Committee.2 19 The case resulted from the refusal of sev-
eral broadcasters to sell time for editorial advertisements to two
organizations. Business Executives' Move and the Democratic Na-
tional Committee filed complaints with the FCC alleging that
broadcasters' flat bans on the sale of time for editorial ads violated
both the Communications Act and the first amendment. The FCC
937 (1982)). In Lugar, the Court stated that a finding of state action satisfies the "under
color of state law" requirement, but the reverse is not necessarily true. 457 U.S. at 935 n.18.
210. 301 F. Supp. at 633.
211. 323 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
212. 323 F. Supp. at 803.
213. 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cerL denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946).
214. 87 F. Supp. 822 (D. Mass. 1949), qffd, 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950).
215. 323 F. Supp. at 803.
216. Id. n.3.
217. Id. at 803.
218. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nor. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.s. 94 (1973).
219. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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rejected the complaints,2" but in Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace v. FCC, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed, finding that a ban on all editorial
ads was unconstitutional. An integral element of the appeals
court ruling was the finding that the actions of the broadcasters
constituted government action. In overturning the appellate court
decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the FCC that neither the
Communications Act nor the Constitution required broadcasters
to sell time for the discussion of controversial issues. However,
the Supreme Court was unable to agree on the state action ques-
tion. Part III of Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court re-
jected the state action contention. 221 Only two other Justices,
Stewart and Rehnquist, concurred in that portion of the opinion.
The Court's failure to agree on the state action issue forced the
Chief Justice in the final portion of the decision to determine
"whether assuming governmental action," the broadcasters' deni-
als of access violated the first amendment..22  He concluded that
they did not.
Judge Wright's symbiosis analysis in Business Executives' Move
for Vietnam Peace v. FCC followed the traditional approach used
by courts in other contexts, which entails the identification of fac-
tual indicators of government entanglement with the private
party.223 Despite the strong symbiosis case he developed, Judge
Wright then proceeded to apply nexus theory, which he also found
applicable in Business Executives' Move. 24 The court concluded
that the overall relationship between broadcasters and the FCC,
and FCC approval of the broadcasters' policy, "taken together,"
fulfilled the government action requirement. The court did not
discuss the adequacy of either factor taken separately, except for
the statement that the specific nexus was "an even more impor-
tant factor" than the general relationship of interdependence and
joint participation.2
220. See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970); Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970).
221. 412 U.S. at 114-21.
222. Id. at 121.
223. Wright characterized the relationship between the federal government and broad-
casters as an "extraordinary" one, marked by "interdependence" and "joint participation."
Broadcasters, he said, were recipients of the preferred use of a part of the public domain
and lessees of federal property. Finally, "automatic, continuing and pervasive" regulation
by the FCC and the broadcasters' role as "proxies" or "fiduciaries" of the public supported
a symbiosis finding. 450 F.2d at 651-52.
224. l at 652-53.
225. I& at 651-52.
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Wright's hesitancy to base his state action finding on a theory
that could subject all broadcaster actions to constitutional scrutiny
has been reflected in other judicial opinions as well. Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in CBS v. Democratic National Committee identified
four factors supporting a government action determination: "the
public nature of the airwaves, the governmentally created pre-
ferred status of broadcast licensees, the pervasive federal regula-
tion of broadcast programming, and the Commission's specific
approval of the challenged broadcaster policy."m' Like Wright,
Brennan did not indicate whether any individual indicator of gov-
ernmental involvement was itself sufficient or whether the com-
posite was needed. Brennan, however, also noted that
government involvement with the specific policy under scrutiny
was the most important element.227
Chief Justice Burger's treatment of the state action issue clearly
hinged on his belief that different considerations affected the deci-
sion in CBS than in other contexts. Journalistic independence and
discretion provided the cornerstone of his analysis.2 s The Chief
Justice gave only cursory attention to traditional symbiosis crite-
ria and definitions. According to Burger, government was not en-
gaged in a "'symbiotic relationship' with the licensee, profiting
from the invidious discrimination of its proxy," as in Burton.29
The use of public property and government regulation arguments
was acknowledged and dismissed in a footnote as "superficially ap-
pealing but . . . 'not entirely satisfactory.' " The regulatory
scheme in Pollak, Burger contended, was more pervasive than
broadcast regulation. But, above all, broadcasters, unlike the
transit company, were entitled to journalistic independence, a con-
cept, Burger said, that "could not co-exist with a reading of the
challenged conduct of the licensee as governmental action.
231
Burger's refusal to give the applicability of symbiosis theory de-
tailed consideration, coupled with Wright's and Brennan's reluc-
tance to base their views on that all-encompassing form of state
action, seems to have sealed the judicial fate of the symbiotic rela-
tionship thread of state action in broadcasting cases.23 In the first
226. 412 U.S. at 173.
227. Id. at 177.
228. Id. at 116-18.
229. Id. at 119.
230. Id. at 115 rL14 (quoting Jaffee, The Editorial Responsibility ofthe Broadcaster. Re.
flectiona on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L REv. 768, 783 (1972)).
231. 412 U.S. at 120-21.
232. At least one federal court saw Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.. 163 (1972), as
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case to arise after CBS, the Puerto Rico Federal District Court dis-
posed of the plaintiff's symbiosis claims by declaring that the act
of licensing did not convert broadcasters into federal agents.M In
subsequent cases, which provided more thorough and thoughtful
analyses of state action claims, decisions were based on the nexus
theory after the courts noted that the question of whether a
symbiotic relationship existed between the federal government
and broadcasters was one that was "left open" by the CBS
litigation.'
By the late 1970's, courts began interpreting the "open" question
of symbiosis as one closed by Wright's, Brennan's, and other
judges' emphasis on the importance of a nexus between govern-
ment and the challenged conduct.' In 1980, District Court Judge
Duffy summarized the current judicial attitude toward broadcast-
ing and state action:
Thus, it would appear that before governmental action will be
found in the context of a broadcaster's conduct, it must be demon-
strated that the FCC, as agovernment instrumentality, has either
expressly approved or campaigned for the challenged conduct of
the broadcaster. Absent such circumstances, no First Amendment
claim will lie. 2
Unable to reconcile the journalistic role and rights of broadcast-
ers with a theory that would subject journalistic decisions to con-
stitutional scrutiny and restraints, the judiciary has rejected
applicability of the state action theory, which fifteen years ago ap-
peared to be ideally suited to describing the relationship between
foreclosing the possibility of symbiosis theory applying to broadcasters. In Smothers v.
CBS, 351 F. Supp. 622 (C.D. Cal. 1972), decided after the court of appeals ruling in Business
Executives' Move, but before the Supreme Court's reversal of that decision, Judge Hauk
declared, "'[S]tate action' is no longer being expanded; to the contrary, in Moose Lodge the
Supreme Court is clearly contracting the concept." Id at 627 n.8. The court referred to the
Supreme Court's statement in Moose Lodge that licensing and regulation alone were insuf-
ficient to prove government action. 407 U.S. at 173. Furthermore, Judge Hauk found the
government regulation in Moose Lodge "infinitely more restrictive" than broadcast regula-
tion. 351 F. Supp. at 626-27.
233. Moro v. Telemundo, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 920, 925 (D.P.R. 1974).
234. E.g., Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 424 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (D. Conn.
1976), rev'd, 566 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1977); Writers Guild of Am. West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.
Supp. 1064,1138 n.129 (C.D. Cal. 1975), vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
235. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397-400 (5th Cir. 1980);
Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d at 388; Levitch v. CBS, 495 F. Supp. 649,
658 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), offd, 697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983); Central N.Y. Right to Life Fed'n v.
Radio Station WIB, 479 F. Supp, 8, 11 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); Gemini Enters. v. WFMY Televi-
sion Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 567 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
236. Levitch v. CBS, 495 F. Supp. at 658.
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the federal government and broadcasters. To accomplish this,
Chief Justice Burger and others have used what might be termed
a negative approach to symbiosis analysis.' In essence, that ap-
proach says that state action is not present because it should not
be present. The desirability of broadcaster autonomy, liberty, and
independence precludes a finding of symbiosis. This approach to
state action analysis can be found in other contexts as well, espe-
cially those involving challenges to the actions of private institu-
tions, such as hospitals and universities, that have not stemmed
from racial discrimination.' As in the area of broadcasting, the
negative state action approach in such cases results from concerns
over individual autonomy, liberty, and freedom of choice, but it
ignores the Supreme Court's earlier admonition that "[o]nly by
sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious in-
volvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance."" 9
B. Applicability of Symbiosis Theory to Broadcasters
While at least for the present the federal judiciary has rejected
the applicability of the symbiotic relationship theory to broadcast-
ing, the question remains whether application of the traditional,
additive approach to this form of state action analysis would yield
a different result. Therefore, the factors currently being used by
courts to establish the existence of a symbiotic relationship will be
analyzed briefly to ascertain their applicability to broadcasting.
The factors include the three criteria cited by the Supreme
Court-a lessor-lessee relationship between government and a pri-
vate party, operation of a facility open to the public, and mutual
benefits.
Lessor-Lessee Relationship. Many commentators who have ar-
gued that broadcaster action is government action have relied
heavily on licensee use of publicly owned airwaves.' Johnson
237. This negative approach to state action analysis is somewhat akin to Professor
Tribe's "anti-doctrine." The solution to state action problems, Tribe wrote, lies in deter-
mining "what we do not want particular constitutional provisions to control ... what the
Constitution is not about." L TRIBE, supra note 9, §§ 18-1, 18-7, at 1174.
238. See, e.g., Berrios v. Inter Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330 (1st Cir. 1976); Greco v. Orange
Memorial Hosp. Corp., 374 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Tex. 1974), affd, 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House. Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
239. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 US. 715, 722 (1961).
240. Eg., Johnson & Westen, supra note 4, at 589-91; Malone, supra note 4, at 241-43
Comment, supra note 195, at 169-71. Contra Robinson, The IM and the rst Amendment,
52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 151-53 (1967).
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and Westen, for example, contended that broadcasters were pri-
vate lessees of public property, akin to the restaurateur in Bur-
ton. 41 If the analogy were accurate, at least the first criterion of
symbiosis would be present in the relationship between broadcast-
ers and the federal government.
For the federal government and broadcasters to be involved in a
lessor-lessee relationship, two conditions must be met. First, the
electromagnetic spectrum must be property capable of definition
and allocation. Second, the spectrum must be property owned by
the federal government and leased to licensees. Both propositions
have been subject to significant disagreement since the inception
of broadcast regulation.
Early versions of the Radio Act of 19271 declared the airways
or "ether" the "inalienable possession of the people" of the United
States.243 After much debate, though, the ownership language was
deleted and instead United States control over radio channels was
asserted, and private ownership of spectrum space was prohib-
ited.'" A key reason for that decision was disagreement over
whether the spectrum was property capable of being possessed by
anyone. While a few members of Congress argued strongly that
the airways were federal property, others contended the concept
was meaningless and without basis in fact. 4
The debate over whether the electromagnetic spectrum could
be termed property continued decades after the first broadcast
regulation was enacted. In 1967, former FCC member Glen 0.
241. Johnson & Westen, supra note 4, at 589-91.
242. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
243. See S. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1926); S. 1754,69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1926); H.R.
5589, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1926).
244. Ch. 169, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
245. See, e.g., To Regulate Radio Communication, supra note 153, at 21-25, 88-91; 68
CONG. RFc. 2869-81 (1927); 67 CONG. REC. 5487 (1926).
Senator Dill, whose first version of the radio bill contained ownership language, later
defended its exclusion: 'This talk about air channels, this talk about owning the ether, has
no real basis except as considered in terms of regulating the apparatus that sends its im-
pulses out through the ether and air and through everything on this earth .... That
language is to a large extent verbiage." 68 CONG. REC. 2873 (1927).
Supporters of the ownership language appeared motivated primarily by fears that, with-
out such a provision, broadcasters would seek and obtain judicial recognition of personal
property rights to frequencies. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REc. 2573-77, 2874-75, 4109 (1927). They
suggested several theories to support their views. Representative Tom D. McKeown said
federal ownership could be based on "the common law of air space," which he said held
that the air above property belongs to the property owner. To Regulate Radio Communica-
tion, aupra note 153, at 91. Senator Robert Howell said the people of the United States




Robinson agreed with the members of the Sixty-Ninth Congress
who declared that ownership of the ether was nonsense.2  On the
other hand, Professor Donald Malone has argued that the spec-
trum constitutes definable property, a natural resource under con-
gressional control, portions of which are allocated to private
parties for specific uses.2 7
The FCC also has indicated that it views the spectrum as prop-
erty capable of being leased, if Congress would enact appropriate
legislation. In its 1978 Notice of Inquiry on broadcast license fees,
the FCC stated: "In the past the radio frequency spectrum has not
been treated as a natural resource to be rented or leased. How-
ever, consideration should be given to treating it that way in the
future." 48 The Commission likened the spectrum to federal
lands, which can be leased to private individuals "who wish to drill
for oil and gas, mine coal, or graze cattle or sheep.
'249
Whether the spectrum constitutes property in the usual sense of
the word, susceptible to ownership and occupancy, is a question
that defies a definitive answer. Even assuming that the airways
are property, the legislative history of the Radio Act indicates that
Congress made a clear decision not to declare that property a fed-
eral possession to be leased to licensees. Elimination of the own-
ership language from the Radio Act was purposeful, not a mere
oversight. Thus, it would appear that by congressional decision
the electromagnetic spectrum is not federal property, but rather a
unique natural resource. Through the Radio Act, and later the
Communications Act, Congress declared that the federal govern-
ment had the power to control and regulate this resource, and that
no individual, group, or corporation could assert ownership rights
to any part of it. This conclusion is bolstered by the FCC's state-
ment on spectrum fees, recognizing that congressional action
would be needed to convert the spectrum into federal rental
property.
Operation of a Facility Open to the Public. Broadcasters, of
course, are required by law to serve the public convenience, inter-
est, and necessity.2' That service to the public, however, consists
246. Terming the ownership concept "meaningless" and "fantasy," Robinson wrote, "In
actuality, 'airways' is merely a convenient shorthand, an abstraction for a phenomenon cre-
ated as a result of the use of privately owned transmission facilities. The 'spectrum' is a
purely artificial construct of the Commission itself." Robinson, suprm note 240, at 151-52.
247. Malone, supra note 4, at 241-42.
248. Fee Refunds and Future FCC Fees, 69 F.C.C.2d 741, 770 (1978).
249. Id. at 768.
250. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a) (1982).
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of providing programming. Constitutional claims against broad-
casters, on the other hand, generally arise because of broadcasters'
refusals to open up their facilities for public use, to allow the pub-
lic access to their studios, cameras, microphones, and transmission
equipment. The Communications Act explicitly declares that
broadcasters are not common carriers who are obliged to provide
nondiscriminatory service to all comers.2 1 Furthermore, most
courts that have considered this issue have declared that radio and
TV stations are not public forums open to all who have messages
to convey. 2 Nonetheless, access supporters have argued that
broadcasters regularly open portions of the broadcasting day to
the public. They contend that commercial entities interested in
conveying messages about their products and services generally
are allowed nondiscriminatory access to airtime, assuming they
* can pay the going rate.' While program times does not constitute
a facility regularly open to the public, perhaps advertising time is
analogous to the public restaurant operating in a public building in
Burton.
That argument, however, cannot withstand careful scrutiny.
First, courts consistently have held that privately owned media
can exert as much control over their advertising content as their
editorial/entertainment content.2 4 In other words, the media are
free to accept or reject advertising at will, assuming no violation of
251. Id § 153(h).
252. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 108-11, 124-30 (1973); Barn-
stone v. University of Houston, 660 F.2d 137, 138 (5th Cir. 1981), affd on rehg, 688 F.2d 1033
(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983); Muir v. Alabama Educ. Televi-
sion Comm'n, 656 F.2d 1012, 1019-22 (5th Cir. 1981), affd on reh, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983). But cf. Kelley v. WMUL-TV, 7 Med. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1095, 1097 (S.D.W. Va. 1980) (a candidates' debate on a government owned
station is a public forum).
Even in Red lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Supreme Court's
most expansive enunciation of the public's rights vis-a-vis broadcasting, the Court carefully
confined its discussion to the public's right to receive information via the airwaves. Id. at
390. See also CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) ("the public's right to
be informed"); Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Lcensees, 15 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949)
("[t]he right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the Govern-
ment, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own
particular views on any matter").
253. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 199 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir.
1971). rev'd sub nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); In re Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 233 (1970) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting); Johnson & Wes-
ten, supra note 4, at 584, 627.
254. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Associates & Aldrich
Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc.
v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).
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contracts, antitrust laws, or other statutory provisions.S Second,
individual broadcasters and the industry as a whole have long re-
jected specific commercials and entire categories of commercial
messages for a variety of reasons, ranging from offensiveness to
the protection of children.' Neither law nor reality supports the
argument that airtime of a particular commercial broadcast sta-
tion is a public facility. Thus, the broadcast station is more akin to
the private club than the public restaurant, free to admit some
members of the public to use its facilities to disseminate their
messages while reserving the right to refuse service to others. 7
Mutual Benefits. When the FCC grants a broadcaster a license
to use a portion of the spectrum, it confers an essential and highly
valuable benefit. The FCC itself has compared the value of a li-
cense to a broadcaster to the value of insulin to a diabetic." With-
out the frequency allocation, the broadcast station could not exist.
In addition, a broadcast license has economic value as a commod-
ity. Economist Bruce Owen estimated that the market value of a
licensed TV station in the early 1970's was approximately three
times the original cost of the tangible property of the station.2 9
The problem, though, in establishing the existence of a mutu-
255. The key federal statutory provisions controlling broadcast advertising are the Pub-
lic Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982), upheld in Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), oqffd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972)
(prohibiting the broadcasting of cigarette commercials), and the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982), upheld in CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (requiring
broadcasters to provide reasonable access to candidates for federal office).
256. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, supra note 168, §§ IX (Presentation
of Advertising), X (Claims: General), XI (Contests), XIII (Premiums and Offers). Among
other things, the Television Code provided that broadcasters should refuse ads that would
be objectionable to the community (§ IX(4A)), prohibited host-selling in ads aimed at chil-
dren (§ IX(6E)), ads for hard liquor (§ IX(7A)), on-camera drinking of beer and wine (§ IX
(7B)), and ads for fortune-telling, occultism, and like subjects (§ IX(70)). See also Shin-
ners, Offensive Personal Product Advertising on the Broadcast Media: Can It Be Constitu-
tionally Censored?, 34 FED. COM. L.J. 49, 49 nn. 1-2 (1982).
257. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private club) with Bur-
ton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (public restaurant).
258. Fee Refunds and Future FCC Fees, 69 F.C.C.2d 741, 762-63 (1978).
259. B. OWENS, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 110 n.h (1975). In 1973, the
average original cost of a TV station's investment in tangible property was about $2,229,500,
and the average original cost minus depreciation was $969,530. Id at 101 Table 3-9. From
1970 through 1972, the average sale price of a television station was $6,165,000. Id at 110
Table 3-14. Admittedly, comparing original cost or depreciated original cost with sale price
does not account for inflation and the fact that the replacement cost of tangible property in
1970 would be considerably higher than its original cost in, say, 1960. Nor does it take into
account such intangibles as goodwill. Nonetheless, without a license to operate the tangible
property and capitalize on the goodwill, much of a station's property would be worth little
more than salvage value.
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ally beneficial relationship is the lack of reciprocity. While a li-
cense represents an extremely valuable government-granted
benefit, broadcasters do not confer comparable economic beneifts
on the federal government. In Burton, the Supreme Court spoke
of a private entity serving as a "physically and financially integral
and, indeed, indispensable part" of a government operation.m
Lower courts, in addressing symbiosis claims, have continued to
approach the mutual benefits factor in economic terms.m1 Aside
from minimal license fees, broadcasters have not paid the federal
government for use of the electromagnetic spectrum, although
several proposals to institute spectrum rents have been offered.'
At least at present, the reciprocity aspect of the mutual benefits
requirements is lacking.
In determining whether a symbiotic relationship exists between
government and a private entity, courts generally use an additive
approach. In the case of broadcasters, the required sum of indica-
tors is not met. Therefore, under the existing definition of symbi-
osis, state action is not present in the overall relationship between
the FCC and broadcast licensees. Of course, changes in the regu-
latory scheme could alter the equation. For example, the assess-
ment against broadcasters of spectrum rental fees could affect the
analysis of both the lessor-lessee and mutual benefits criteria. The
FCC's Notice of Inquiry on spectrum user fees clearly rested on
the assumption that the airways could be deemed federal property
260. 365 U.S. at 723.
261. In Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971),
in which plaintiffs claimed a symbiotic relationship existed between privately owned news-
papers and the State of Colorado and City of Denver, the court emphasized the need for
mutual benefits of an economic character. "Except for revenue obtained from taxation, the
presence of defendants is not financially advantageous to these governments." Id at 1103.
See also Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979), cert de-
nied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Braden v. University
of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977).
It could be argued, though, that broadcasters benefit the federal government by provid-
ing a nationwide medium through which government officials can communicate with citi-
zens, a mechanism for informing the public of what is occurring in Washington, D.C.
Instant access to the public, while undoubtedly useful and desirable, however, can hardly
be considered integral or indispensable to the operation of the federal government--espe-
cially since government managed to exist for more than a century and a half without it.
262. E.g., H.R. 3333 § 414, The Communications Act of 1979: Hearings on HR 3333
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-94 (1979); H.R. 13,015 § 413, The Communications Act of
197& Hearings on HR 13,015 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the House
Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 72-76 (1978); Fee Refunds
and Future FCC Fees, 69 F.C.C.2d 741 (1978).
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to be leased.' In addition, spectrum fee proposals generally en-
vison fees generating substantial revenue for the federal govern-
ment, which might satisfy the mutual benefits element of
symbiosis.2 4
VI
Broadcasters and the Nexus Test
Currently, the nexus test is the most viable state action theory,
especially in cases involving broadcasters. Because the nexus test
is incident-specific, it allows for a finding of state action in a par-
ticular factual context, while permitting broadcasters to remain
free of constitutional restrictions in the remainder of their activi-
ties. Thus, the nexus theory has the greatest appeal for a judiciary
concerned with protecting journalistic autonomy and the editorial
discretion rights of broadcasters.
A. The Cases
In all broadcasting cases in which judges have found state action
sufficient to invoke constitutional restraints, evidence of a nexus
between government and the challenged conduct has been the de-
cisive factor. In Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v.
FCC," Judge Wright distinguished the case from earlier broad-
casting state action cases, which he said had involved purely pri-
vate decisions by licensees.
In the cases before us now, however, the Commission has given its
imprimatur to the flat ban on editorial advertising. It specifically
considered and specifically authorized the flat ban. Thus we are
called upon to review not simply a private decision, but a decision
by a government agency, a decision which must inevitably provide
guidance for future broadcaster action.
2M
Citing Shelley v. Kraemer,' 7 in which judicial enforcement of a
privately devised restrictive covenant was held to be state action,
263. Fee Refunds and Future FCC Fees, 69 F.C.C.2d 741, 766-70 (1978).
264. Id, at 770-74. H.R. 3333, supra note 262, § 414(d)(1), would have provided that fees
go to the U.S. Treasury, while H.R. 13,015, supra note 258, § 413, would have created a
"telecommunications fund" from broadcast fees to be used to support the regulatory system
and to fund public broadcasting, minority ownership of stations, and rural telecommunica-
tions. See generally Fowler & Brenner, supra note 1, at 248-55; NAB-NRBA at odds over
spectrum fqe, BROADCASTING, July 5, 1982, at 60.
265. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973).
266. 450 F.2d at 652.
267. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Wright declared that "specific governmental approval of or acqui-
escence in challenged action by a private organization indicates
'state action.' ",268
When Business Executives' Move was appealed to the Supreme
Court, Justice Brennan's dissent reiterated Wright's emphasis on
FCC specific consideration and authorization of the editorial ad
ban.269 Furthermore, Brennan found the nexus test met by gen-
eral FCC policies. "There is, for example, an obvious nexus be-
tween the Commission's Fairness Doctrine and the absolute
refusal of broadcast licensees to sell any part of their air time to
groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues
of public importance."' 0 In Justice Brennan's view, the fairness
doctrine and other policies emanating from the Communications
Act were "inextricably linked to" and had influenced develop-
ment of the editorial ad ban.Y"
In his opinion, which failed to find state action, Chief Justice
Burger defined FCC approval of the ad ban as a failure to com-
mand access, not a fostering of the challenged policy: "The First
Amendment does not reach acts of private parties in every in-
stance where Congress or the Commission has merely permitted
or failed to prohibit such acts." 27 2 What Wright and Brennan saw
as affirmative government support, Burger viewed as government
"declin[ing] to command" the opposite."z3
Because the Supreme Court was so splintered in its state action
opinion in CBS v. Democratic National Committee, lower courts
faced with constitutional claims against broadcasters since 1973
have been forced to piece together a rationale for their decisions
from the various opinions. Ironically, the dissenting opinion in
CBS, coupled with Wright's analysis in Business Executives'Move,
eventually proved to be most useful for lower courts. In address-
ing later state action claims, judges frequently turned to those
opinions to justify the conclusion that, at a minimum, express
FCC approval of, or participation in, the challenged activity is nec-
essary to prove sufficient government involvement." 4
268. 450 F.2d at 652.
269. 412 U.S. at 177-78.
270. Id. at 177.
271. Id at 177-78.
272. Id. at 119.
273. Id. at 118.
274. See, e.g., Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 398-99 (5th Cir.
1980); Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d 384, 387-88 (2d Cir. 1977); Levitch
v. CBS, 495 F. Supp. 649, 657-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), offd, 697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Writers Guild of America West, Inc. v. FCC,z in which the
nexus finding was based on "backroom bludgeoning," government
threats and coercion, and the usurpation of broadcaster autonomy,
frequently was used to bolster that conclusion. In Writers Guild,
plaintiffs challenged the networks' and the National Association
of Broadcasters' family viewing policy on statutory and constitu-
tional grounds."8 In his opinion, Judge Ferguson addressed a
multitude of issues, the key one for this study being whether en-
tanglement among the FCC, NAB, and networks was adequate to
prove state action. The "Factual Findings" detailed manifesta-
tions of congressional and FCC concern over violence on TV,
meetings and conversations between broadcasters and FCC staff
and commissioners, public statements of former FCC Chairman
Richard Wiley, and network development and adoption of the
family hour.1 7 The court stated that the facts showed enactment
of the viewing policy "was caused substantially by government
pressure" and that "the networks served in a surrogate role in
achieving implementation of government policy."278 Chairman
Wiley, the court concluded, had "launched a campaign primarily
designed to alter the content of" early evening programming, a
campaign that included threats of regulatory action and "persis-
tent, pronounced, and unmistakable" pressure. Were it not for
FCC pressure, the family hour would not have been adopted.
2 7 9
The court characterized FCC involvement as government compul-
sion or coercion and, therefore, sufficient to prove state action.80
In dicta, Ferguson opined that mere government encouragement
to act, even if such encouragement had been the cause of broad-
caster action, would not have been sufficient to prove state ac-
tion.8 The Writers Guild facts, however, crossed the line
between government encouragement and government coercion.~
28
Before and even after the Ninth Circuit's action vacating and re-
manding the Writers Guild decision, judges added the Writers
Guild analysis to the various opinions in CBS and Business Execu-
tives' Move to support their conclusions that FCC approval of or
275. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1975), vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
276. See upra text accompanying notes 165-67.
277. 423 F. Supp. at 1092-1128.
278. Id. at 1140.
279. Id. at 1094.
280. Id. at 1141.
281. Id. at 1136.
282. Id. at 1140-41.
283. 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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involvement in the challenged conduct was necessary to support a,
state action finding.2 4
B. Applicability of Nexus Theory to Broadcasting
As already noted, the nexus test for state action is incident-spe-
cific. It is the thread of state action doctrine in which "sifting facts
and weighing circumstances"'  are necessary to reach a conclu-
sion. Unlike the government function and symbiosis types of state
action, generalizations about the overall applicability of the nexus
test to broadcasting are impossible. The conclusion in each case
must rest on the role government played in the broadcaster's deci-
sion to perform the challenged act or in the implementation of
that decision. This section, therefore, focuses on the problems and
issues that must be faced in applying nexus theory to government
involvement with broadcasting.
The first problem is that recent Supreme Court decisions and
the general trend that the Burger Court has followed in address-
ing state action claims have created uncertainty as to exactly what
types of government involvement will meet the nexus test. The
Court's 1982 trilogy of cases clearly states that joint participation
of state officials with private actors28 and government coercion or
compulsion 2 7 meet the nexus requirement. The status of govern-
ment encouragement as an indicator of state action, however, is
less clear.
In both Rendell-Baker v. Kohn 2 8 and Blum v. Yaretsky,2 9 the
Court held that state action would be found if there is "such sig-
nificant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice
must in law be deemed to be that of the State."'  In Rendell-
Baker, the Court found no evidence that the employee discharges
were "compelled or even influenced by any state regulation."291
The Court, however, did acknowledge that in Blum, "[b]oth state
and federal regulations encouraged the nursing homes to transfer
284. See cases cited supra note 274. See also Central N.Y. Right to Life Fed'n v. Radio
Station WIBX, 479 F. Supp. 8. 11 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); Gemini Enters. v. WFM1Y Television
Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 568 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
285. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
286. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982).
287. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1004 (1982).
288. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
289. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
290. Id. at 1004; 457 U.S. at 840.
291. 457 U.S. at 841.
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patients to less expensive facilities when appropriate." 2 2 Appar-
ently, though, the government encouragement present in Blum
did not rise to the level of "significant encouragement." In early
cases involving private racial discrimination, the Warren Court
found state action solely on the basis of government encourage-
ment.' s "[A] prohibited state involvement [can] be found 'even
where the state can be charged with only encouraging,' rather
than commanding discrimination."'  The Warren Court encour-
agement cases have been neither overturned nor expressly rein-
terpreted, and, indeed, the Burger Court has referred to the
absence of state encouragement as a factor in some of its no-state-
action holdings.' 5 But, in light of Rendell-Baker and Blum, it ap-
pears that government encouragement must approach govern-
ment pressure to meet the nexus test. This interpretation is
supported by the cases addressing state action claims against
broadcasters. In Writers Guild of America West, Inc., v. FCC,'
the trial court declared government encouragement was insuffi-
cient to meet the nexus test because of the editorial discretion
rights of broadcasters.' Subsequent cases have referred to gov-
ernment pressure as a minimum requirement to support a state
action finding.298
Related to the question of the viability of the encouragement
rationale is the issue of whether the nexus test requires proof that
the private party's action was motiviated by governmental direc-
tive or pressure. The Warren Court expressly refused to inquire
into motivation in some early state action cases.2" Responding to
the city's contention that the private restaurant would have re-
fused to serve blacks even in the absence of a segregation ordi-
292. Id. (emphasis added).
293. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153
(1964).
294. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. at 375 (quoting Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529,540,
413 P.2d 825, 832, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 888 (1966)).
295. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 n.17 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173, 176-77
(1972).
296. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1975), vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1979), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
297. Id. at 1138.
298. Belluso v. Turner Communications, 633 F.2d 393, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1980); Kuczo v.
Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 1977); Levitch v. CBS, 495 F.
Supp. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), qffd, 697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983); Gemini Enters. v. WFMY
Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 568 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
299. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153,155-56 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267,
273 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963).
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nance, the Court in Peterson v. City of Greenville3°° refused to
consider the "mental urges of the discriminators."" The mere
existence of a law compelling segregation was sufficient to prove
government coercion. In later decisions, though, the Burger Court
indicated that in cases of alleged governmental directive or en-
couragement, the impetus for the challenged activity must come
from government.' 2 This motivation theme also runs through the
broadcasting decisions. In Writers Guild, the court said that the
adoption of the family viewing policy "was caused substantially by
government pressure" ' and "were it not for the pressure [Chair-
man Wiley] exerted, it would not have been adopted by any of the
networks nor by the NAB."3' 4 It appears, then, that not only must
government engage in "significant encouragement" or pressure
for the nexus test to be met, but also the challenged conduct must
be caused or motivated by government's involvement.
It is also uncertain whether express and formal government ap-
proval of challenged conduct is adequate to meet the nexus test.
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak",3 ° the Court "rel[ied]
particularly" on the Commission's approval of the challenged
practice after an investigation and formal public hearings. ' 6
However, in none of the Court's 1982 state action cases was gov-
ernment approval listed as a means of meeting the nexus require-
ment. "Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a
private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsi-
ble for those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth
300. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
301. Id at 248.
302. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("the question typically is whether the
private motives which triggered the enforcement of those laws can fairly be attributed to
the State"); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 174 (1970) (state action present if the
discriminatory conduct "was motivated by" a state-enforced custom); Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435, 445 (1970) (harm resulted from "a private party . .. injecting the racially discrim-
inatory motivation").
When the nexus test is met by a private party's joint participation with state officials, the
motivation of the private actor apparently is not a consideration. This seemed to be the
dissenters' key point of disagreement with the five-member majority in Lugar v. Edmond-
son Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). "'[R]espondent's exercise of the choice allowed by state
law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State does not make its action in
doing so "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Id at 949-50 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974))
(emphasis added).
303. 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
304. Id at 1094.
305. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
306. Id at 462.
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Amendment," the Court said in Blum.' This squares with the
Court's emphasis on the motivation or impetus for the challenged
conduct coming from government. Approval connotes after-the-
fact government involvement; motivation entails pre-decision or
pre-action involvement by government. While never formally dis-
carding the express approval rationale of Pollak, the Court ap-
pears to have significantly limited the empirical definition of that
rationale by distinguishing between government approval and
mere acquiescence in, pro forma approval of, or failure to disap-
prove private choice."~s Although the recent broadcasting cases
have referred to FCC approval as an acceptable proof of nexus, 30 9
the Supreme Court's narrow empirical definition of approval indi-
cates that this form of state action has lost its vitality.
The preceding discussion of the approval rationale points to an-
other, and perhaps the most serious, difficulty in applying nexus
theory to broadcasting: the need to apply such concepts as ap-
proval, coercion, and encouragement to actual situations. In Busi-
ness Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC610 and CBS v.
Democratic National Committee, 1' what was considered FCC ap-
proval by Judge Wright 12 and Justice Brennan313 was seen as the
FCC's failure to command the opposite by Chief Justice Burger.1 4
It is not easy to discern the distinction between Public Utilities
Commission approval of the challenged practice in the Pollak
case 31 5 and FCC failure to disapprove private choice in CBS. Both
cases involved governmental bodies receiving complaints, con-
ducting investigations, and then issuing decisions. If express gov-
ernmental approval is that difficult to define empirically, concepts
such as coercion and encouragement presumably present even
greater problems. In Writers Guild, the trial court had little diffi-
culty identifying empirical manifestations of coercion in the words
307. 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982).
308. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 164-65; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. at 357; CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 118 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
309. Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d at 400, Kuczo v. Western Conn.
Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d at 388; Levitch v. CBS, 495 F. Supp. at 658; Central N.Y. Right to
Life Fed'n v. Radio Station WIBX, 479 F. Supp. at 11.
310. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973).
311. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
312. See supra notes 265.69 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
315. 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
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and actions of FCC members.316 Nevertheless, the FCC's reliance
on a "raised eyebrow" approach to regulation has been frequently
noted.317 Because of the FCC's power to revoke and deny renewal
of licenses, a word or look of disapproval can be as powerful a
coercive technique as an overt threat of government regulation or
disciplinary action. Consider, for example, Post v. Payton,31" in
which two radio stations were closed and the stations' director
fired because of the alleged broadcast of obscenities. The licensee
stated that the obscenities posed a threat to its broadcast li-
cerise.319 The United States Criminal Code prohibits broadcasting
obscene, indecent or profane language,3 20 and beginning in the
1960's several broadcasters had problems with the FCC because of
such language.321 The record does not indicate that plaintiffs
raised the issue of defendant's stated fear of FCC reprisal as proof
of state involvement. However, the licensee's actions certainly
could be viewed as a response to FCC coercion, pressure, or, at
least, encouragement. Or consider a hypothetical case resulting
from a radio station's refusal to play certain records in the wake of
the FCC's 1971 Notice reminding broadcasters of their responsibil-
ity to determine whether songs containing drug-oriented lyrics
promote illegal drug use.322 Many broadcasters and observers re-
garded the notice as a thinly veiled threat that licenses would be
in jeopardy if drug-oriented records were aired.3  When dealing
with a government entity, such as the FCC, which has the power
to put a party out of business completely, coercion or pressure can
take on innumerable manifestations. As former White House Di-
rector of Telecommunications Policy Clay Whitehead has ob-
316. See supra notes-275-82 and accompanying text.
317. See D. GiNSBURG, supra note 183, at 449-92.
318. 323 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
319. Id. at 800-01.
320. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982).
321. See, e.g., WUHY-FM Eastern Educ. Radio, 18 RAn. REG. 2d (P & F) 860 (1970); In re
Pacifica Found., 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964); Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), 34
F.C.C. 101 (1963), affd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 379
U.S. 843 (1964).
322. In re Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28
F.C.C.2d 409, reconsid., 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971).
323. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert denied, 414
U.S. 914 (1973); Comment, Drug Songs and the Federal Communications Commission, 5 U.
MIcH. J.L REF. 334 (1972); Comment, Drug Lyrics, the FCC and the First Amendment 5
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 329 (1972).
According to Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, the notice meant, "[G]et those drug lyrics
off the air ... or you may have trouble at license renewal time." 28 F.C.C.2d 409, 412
(1971) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
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served, "The main value of the sword of Damocles is that it hangs,
not that it drops." 4
The FCC's history of using the National Association of Broad-
casters' self-regulation mechanisms as an alternative to govern-
ment regulation raises many possibilities of FCC coercion,
pressure, encouragement, or actual participation.3 25  Writers
Guild provides the prime example. Cases involving denials of ac-
cess to proponents and practitioners of occult sciences have also
raised the issue of whether the FCC can be held ultimately re-
sponsible for the ban on programming promoting belief in astrol-
ogy and related subjects.'s Indeed, some commentators have
suggested that because of the basically reactionary nature of the
NAB, many provisions of the former Radio and Television Codes
could be traced to overt or subtle government ultimatums to
either self-regulate or be regulated.3 z
A final problem in applying nexus theory to broadcasters in-
volves the consideration that should be given to the editorial or
journalistic discretion rights of broadcasters in state action analy-
sis. Writers Guild noted that because of broadcasters' interest in
autonomy, "mere [government] encouragement even accompanied
by causation" would be insufficient for a state action finding.'
Chief Justice Burger also emphasized autonomy, liberty, and inde-
pendence in his CBS opinion.3s It is a crucial issue for broadcast-
ers, who already see themselves as second-class citizens under the
first amendment, subject to government-imposed content controls
that would be unconstitutional if applied to print media.s ° Con-
cerns over broadcaster autonomy and discretion, however, are ill-
conceived if the basis for a nexus allegation is government coer-
cion, pressure, or encouragement, concepts that suggest broad-
caster autonomy has already been sacrificed. Nevertheless, when
government approval is the ground for a state action claim, judi-
324. Cannon, Nixon Aide Explains License Challenges, Washington Post, Mar. 9, 1973,
at A17.
325. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
326. Mark v. FCC, 468 F.2d 266 (1st Cir. 1972); Gemini Enters. v. WFMY Television
Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
327. See, e.g., J. SILBER, BROADCAST REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDm"NT 20-21
(Journalism Monographs No. 70, 1980); Note, supra note 169, at 1550-53.
328. 423 F. Supp. at 1138.
329. 412 U.S. at 116-18.
330. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (newspaper
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395 U.S. 367 (1969) (FCC's fairness doctrine in general, and right-of-reply rules in particu-
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cial concern over broadcaster discretion may be justifed. The im-
plications of allowing a broadcaster's initially private decision to
be converted into state action simply by the FCC declaring that
the decision violates neither the Communications Act nor FCC
rules and policies are serious. Such a route would allow complain-
ants to control state action determinations merely by complaining
to the FCC and obtaining an unfavorable agency ruling in advance
of going to court. The danger to broadcaster autonomy presented
by accepting FCC approval as a form of nexus, coupled with a de-
sire to keep the approval category of state involvement alive in
other contexts, may explain Chief Justice Burger's skirting the is-
sue in CBS by characterizing FCC action as failure to disapprove,
rather than as approval.
VII
Conclusion
Of the three major threads of state action doctrine, neither gov-
ernment function nor symbiosis theory is applicable to broadcast-
ing. Broadcasting is not a function traditionally and exclusively
reserved to the federal government. While broadcast regulation is
a government function, industry self-regulation cannot be viewed
as state action because neither the NAB nor any other voluntary
industry organization has government's power to command adher-
ence to its rules and policies and impose license-threatening sanc-
tions. Furthermore, the FCC's own reliance on alternatives to
government regulation of content erodes the argument that con-
trolling broadcast content is an exclusively governmental activity.
Symbiosis theory is likewise inapplicable because the FCC and
broadcasters are not involved in an overall relationship of interde-
pendence. The Supreme Court has made it clear that regulation
alone is insufficient to prove state action. Even assuming that the
electromagnetic spectrum can be characterized as public property
that is leased to private licensees, the two remaining criteria for a
symbiosis finding are lacking in the FCC-broadcaster relationship.
Broadcast airtime does not constitute a facility open to the public,
nor does a mutually beneficial economic relationship exist be-
tween the FCC and broadcasters. While broadcasters receive es-
sential and highly valuable benefits from the FCC, namely their
licenses, reciprocity is lacking in the relationship.
Only the nexus theory of state action, which is incident-specific
and requires analysis of the particular challenged broadcaster ac-
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tivity, is applicable to broadcasters. Courts that have considered
the applicability of state action doctrine to broadcasters in the
wake of CBS v. Democratic National Committee and Writers
Guild have concluded that compelling FCC conduct in the form of
express approval, coercion, significant pressure, or actual partici-
pation is necessary to convert broadcaster action into governmen-
tal action. These conceptual definitions of nexus coincide with the
definitions of state involvement apparently still viable in non-
broadcasting contexts, with the possible exception of express ap-
proval, the status of which is now uncertain.
In light of the FCC's traditional approach to regulation-fre-
quent reliance on the "raised eyebrow" and the industry's self-reg-
ulation mechanisms-the government coercion, significant
pressure, and actual participation forms of nexus appear to be the
most appropriate theories of state involvement to apply to broad-
caster action. They are appropriate because they allow courts to
investigate and potentially to stop the most insidious forms of
state involvement, that is, government coercion, pressure, or par-
ticipation designed to compel private entities to do that which gov-
ernment itself cannot do within the bounds of constitutional,
statutory, or public opinion limits. Furthermore, the coercion,
pressure, and participation theories of nexus have merit because
their application supports and enhances the broadcaster's ability
to exercise journalistic discretion and autonomy. In contrast, the
express approval form of nexus is ill-suited for application in
broadcaster state action cases. The mere existence of the FCC in-
vites complaints about and challenges to broadcaster actions. The
FCC's support of an initially independent broadcaster decision
cannot convert that decision into government action subject to
constitutional scrutiny without seriously eroding licensee discre-
tion and autonomy. Furthermore, defining FCC approval of a
broadcaster's actions as state action undermines Judge Ferguson's
basic constitutional ground rule: the state action concept stands
for the principle that individuals-even those holding govern-
ment-granted licenses-are free to be ornery in their private lives
and business dealings. Finally, from a practical point of view, the
adoption of current deregulation proposals may eliminate most of
the FCC's opportunities for express approval of licensee actions.
Repeal of the fairness doctrine and sections 315 and 312 of the
Communications Act"' would remove key sources of citizen com-
331. See supra note 1.
No. 2]
318 COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 7
plaints to the FCC and restrict the Commission's opportunities to
place its imprimatur on independent broadcaster decisions. Si-
multaneously, elimination of federal content controls on broad-
casting would strengthen the argument for application of the
coercion, significant pressure, and actual participation forms of
nexus theory. Enhancing broadcaster discretion and autonomy
and granting broadcasters full first amendment rights are key
goals enunciated by deregulation proponents. Thus, government
coercion of, pressure on, or participation with, broadcasters as
they make content decisions would be even more anomalous in a
deregulated broadcasting environment than under the existing
regulatory scheme.
